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Joyce Martin, a "hat check girl" at the Knoxville Senators Club,
permitted herpicture to be taken for an internal club bulletin. The club,
however, used Martin's picture in an advertising campaign designed to
attract new members. I A photograph of Martin checking hats appeared
in the Knoxville News Sentinel accompanied by the following words:
Hello Sport! Tired of sitting at home looking at Mom all
night . . . Live a little .. . let us check your hat as a member
of the Senators Club. Membership drive in progress. NO INITIA-
TION FEE. Family Club Membership $40.00 a year. Single Club
Membership $25. 00 a year. Call577-5591fjor details or betterstill
ask a member. P.S-Mom-BETTER COME ALONG AND
WATCH HIM.2
This seemingly harmless photograph became a widely disseminated
picture of Martin checking hats for men's sexual pleasure, helping men
"live a little "3
Mary Jane Russell, a highly successful professional model,
agreed to be photographed reading an educational book in bed A male
model was to be pictured in an adjoining bed. Russell believed the
photograph would be used solely to advertise educational materiaL The
photograph, however, was alteredi4 Russell was portrayed as a high-
priced call girl in the company of an elderly man who was pictured
4 Trial Attorney, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of Justice. B.A. Radcliffe
College, 1978; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1981.
1. Martin v. Senators, Inc., 220 Tenn. 465, 418 S.W.2d 660 (1967) (alleging that
defendants invaded her privacy by displaying a photograph of her publicly, Martin sought
compensatory damages for infliction of great mental pain, humiliation, mortification, and
exposure to public ridicule and disgrace).
2. Id. at 468, 418 S.W.2d at 662.
3. Martin alleged.
[S] he had become the common talk of people in the community; . . . it
was generally understood in the community that she had for hire permitted
her picture to be taken and used as public advertisement, consenting to the
language used in the advertisement.
Id. at 469, 418 S.W.2d at 662.
4. Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc. 2d 166,183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. CL 1959). Russell
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reading Clothes Make the Mai; an obscene book. ' The altered photo-
graph was used in a nationwide advertising campaign for bed sheets.
The text accompanying the picture state&
We bought this picture to advertise Spring Maid Sheets, but we
can't write the caption. Elliott Springs tried, but all he came up
with was Lost Weekend, Knight Errant, Lost Between the Covers
and You Can't Go Wrong With On [sic] a Spring Maid Sheet.'
As part of the advertising campaign, Springs sold copies of Clothes
Make the Man for fifty cents each. 7
Carole Vitale posed for semi-nude and nude photographs in
Playboy, including a centerfold. The National Lampoon used her
centerfold as part of a parody of Playboy advertisements which featured
a man behind the door of a closed bathroom stall The man's sneakers
and pulled-down pants could be seen under the stall door; a Playboy,
opened to the Vitale centerfold, was lying near his feet. The text of the
parody read:
A young man in touch with himself and his own imagination. Self-
reliant, and with an appreciation for his personal privacy, he
keeps his hand close to his chest and an eye out for unexpected
interruptions of his daily routines. With confidence in his ability
to handle himself in tense situations, the PL* YB* Yreader wrings
every last drop of satisfaction from his private pursuits. Helping
him stand up to that challenge is his favorite magazine. Fact!
PL* YB* Yis read by nearly half of all young men who eventually
excell [sic] at tennis, handball, or arm wrestling, and spent at least
$12 onfine spurting goods last year alone. To reach that young
man, put yourself in PL*YB*Y He does (Source: 1973 TGII). 9
claimed that she had not consented to the use of the photographs because several blanks in
the modeling contract were not filled in at the time of signing and that, in any case, trade
usage and oral communications could show that the contract was limited to a specific use of
the photograph. She brought common law libel and statutory invasion of privacy claims for
the alleged use of her picture for advertising purposes without the proper, required consent.
She allegedly had not consented to the use of the picture that was published; instead she had
allegedly consented to the publication of another picture. Her husband brought a loss of
consortium claim.
5. Id. at 171, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 17 ("This book had for some years been nationally
advertised to contain reading matter and illustrations so vulgar in content that publication
thereof had been refused by editors.").
6. Id. at 183, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
7. Id.
8. Vitale v. National Lampoon, Inc., 449 F.Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (alleging that the
use of the photograph with the accompanying comment "was defamatory and libelous in
that it depicted her as a tramp and a lady of perverted morals," id. at 444, and that it was
published libelously with reckless disregard for the truth and with malice).
9. Id. at 448 app. B. See also id. at 447 app. A (reprinting a typical Playboy
advertisement).
[Vol. 1:191
PORNOGRAPHY& PRIVACY
"Miss Wyoming," Kimerli Jayne Pring, performed a baton
twirling act in a Miss America pageant. ' 0 Penthouse Magazine sub-
sequently published a parody on the Miss America pageant. Charlene,
the woman featured in the parody, appears as "Miss Wyoming" in a
Miss America contest. During the pageant, Charlene performs a
fellatio-like act on her baton that stops the orchestra. She also is
described as thinking she might save the world by similar conduct with
high international officials. The Penthouse story ends with Miss
Wyoming performing fellatio and levitating her coach while the
television cameras focus on them rather than on the new Miss
America. 1
Ann-Margret starred in the widely acclaimed motion picture,
Magic. In one of the film's scenes, for the second time in her screen
career, she appeared unclothed from the waist up.'" Ann-Margret
carefully limited the number ofpersons present when the studio filmed
the semi-nude scene. She refused to allow stillphotographs to be made
from the film of her performance." High Society Celebrity Skin a
magazine which specializes in printing photographs of well-known
people caught in the most revealing situations, featured Ann-Margret
in one of its issues. Her photograph appeared on its cover. Additional
photographs appeared inside the magazine. Among them was a still
photograph of her nude scene in the movie, Magic, in which one of her
breasts was visible. "
Linda Lovelace has engaged in group sex for profit, appeared in
pornographic underground films, " and starred in the movie, Deep
Throat 6 Lovelace agreed to take part in these activities after enduring
10. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
11. Pring alleged that publication of the article created the following consequences:
The net effect of the aforementioned article was to create the impression
throughout the United States, Wyoming and the world that the Plaintiff
committed fellatio on one Monty Applewhite (male companion) and also
upon her coach, Corky Corcoran, in the presence of a national television
audience at the Miss America Pageant. The article also creates the
impression that Plaintiff committed fellatio like acts upon her baton at the
Miss America contest.
Id. at 441.
12. Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F.Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendants from using a photograph which depicted her nude from
the waist up. She claimed violation of the right of privacy through the publication of the
photograph, and invasion of her right of publicity through the publication of all the pictures
used in the magazine.
13. Id. at 403 n.2.
14. Id. at 404.
15. In one film Lovelace had sex with a dog, in the other she made love to another woman.
L Lovelace, Ordeal 99-113 (Berkeley paperback ed. 1980) ___-_-_
16. In the movie Lovelace portrayed a woman with a clitoris in her throat, who enjoyed
what, without hypnotism, would have been gag-inducing oral sex.
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beatings, rapes, threats, enslavement, and a coerced marriage to Chuck
Traynor. Lovelace was never paid for her participation in these
activities. Instead, under forged contracts or contracts of adhesion
which she was forced to sign, the profits went to Traynor and to a
corporation he formed-Linda Lovelace Enterprises. "
Victoria Price Street" was the leading prosecution witness in the
"Scottsboro rape trial," a trial famous for its racism. 9 The nine Black
men accused of raping Street, a white woman, were denied the right to
counsel, denied a jury of their peers, and convicted upon insufficient
evidence. 2 0 More than forty years later, NBC televised a privately
produced historical drama about the triaL The drama contained many
inaccuracies about Street, including the statement she was dead. It
portrayed her as a "loose woman, " principally through the defense
attorneys'undocumented descriptions of her as a whore. 21tAt the time of
the broadcast, Street was "chopping and picking cotton, working in the
mills, working as a tenant farmer, living in what most people would call
a shack not 40 miles from Scottsboro with few reminders of what
happened in another era. "22
17. L Lovelace, supra note 15, at 238.
18. Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 454
U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1095 (1981).
19. See generally A. Davis, Women, Race and Class 198-99 (1981).
20. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (establishing right to effective
counsel); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) and Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 600
(1935) (finding invidious discrimination in the selection of the jury); Street v. National
Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d at 1230 (discussing trial judge's reversal of a conviction of one
of the Scottsboro defendants because of insufficient evidence).
21. According to the court:
The effect of the drama as a whole is to create a character, Victoria Price. She
is portrayed as a loose woman who falsely accuses the Scottaboro boys (sic)
of raping her. This image of her character is created throughout the play by
her own words and actions in the flashbacks and in the witness chair and by
what others say about her.
Street, 645 F.2d at 1232-33.
She was called a "bum" and a "hustle." For example, the film portrayed a pre-trial
conversation between the two lawyers representing the Scottsboro defendants in which one
lawyer advises the other to display restraint in the cross-examination. He says, " 'The
Scottaboro transcripts are really clear. . . .The defense at the last trial made one thing
very clear, Victoria was a whore, and they got it in the neck for it. . . . ' (emphasis
added) Id. at 1231 (quoting Judge Horton and the Scottsboro Boys, NBC TV (date
unknown) ). That conversation was allegedly completely fabricated; it did not even appear
in the book on which the historical drama was based.
22. Barbash, Victoria Price: A ccuseroftheScottsboro Boys [sic] Fightsfor4O Years of
Forgetting. Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 1982, at Al, col 5, A2, coL 1 (also reporting that NBC
settled the suit out of court).
As the Post explained:
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Each of these women felt she had been portrayed as a whore.2" Each
objected to that portrayal and all but Linda Lovelace sought legal relief for
invasion of privacy or defamation. 4 None obtained full legal relief. Most
obtained no relief at all."5 This article will examine that failure and suggest
Street hasn't read the [accounts of the "Scottsboro Boys" case in the]
encyclopedias. The only reading materials visible in her house are the
yellowed newspapers she uses as cushions to protect her from the metal wires
that once held her couch together but now protrude from it. For her, the
curtain went down with the last of the Scottsboro trials in 1940 and didn't
rise again until the night of the television program.
Id. at A2, coL 1.
These comments are meant to suggest that Street, alone, was not responsible for the
racist treatment that the Scottsboro youths received. She did not deny them effective
counsel or a jury of their peers.
These comments are not, however, meant to absolve Street, or any women, of
racism. As Angela Davis has noted:
No one can deny that the women [in the Scottsboro trials] were manipulated
by Alabama racists. However, it is wrong to portray the women as innocent
pawns, absolved of the responsibility of having collaborated with the forces
of racism.
A. Davis, supra note 19, at 198.
The extent of racism within the criminal justice system cannot be underestimated.
Of the 455 men executed between 1930 and 1967 on the basis of rape convictions, 405 were
Black. Id. at 172.
This article focuses on the Street defamation case only to show how the media
chooses to portray a woman as a whore for sensationalism. This article presumes that NBC
could have effectively shown the racism of the American judicial system without falsely
-portraying Street as a whore. The racism of the rape charge is beyond the scope of this
article.
23. See supra notes 1-22 and infra note 26.
24. Many of these women also brought a closely related action for defamation. Because
defamation law is closely interrelated with privacy actions, this article will also consider
defamation law in some detaiL See generally W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts §
117, at 813-14 (4th ed. 1971) (commenting on the overlap between defamation and
invasion of privacy; suggesting that any defamation action could be conceptualized as an
invasion of privacy action).
25. Martin, 220 Tenn. at 469, 473,418 S.W. at 662, 664 (demurrer sustained); Russell,
18 Misc. 2d at 182, 191, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 27-28,36 (dismissing all of plaintiff's counts but
granting leave to replead those dealing with alteration of her photograph); Vitale, 449
F.Supp. at 446 (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment); Pring, 695 F.2d at
443 (judgment for plaintiffreversed);Ann-Margret,498 F.Supp. at408 (action dismissed);
Street, 645 F.2d at 1229, 1237 (directed verdict for defendant affirmed).
But in other cases female plaintiffs have been more successful. See Clark v.
American Broadcasting Co., 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982) (reversing and remanding a
summary judgment motion that the district court had granted for the defendant in a
defamation action involving defendant's alleged portrayal of Clark as a street prostitute);
Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 544 F.Supp. 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); 521 F.Supp.
228 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); 496 F.Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y 1980) (Plaintiff prevailed on summary
judgment on claims of right to publicity and invasion of privacy involving defendant'suseof
,plaintiff's name in bold lettering accompanying photographs ofia naked woman and an orgy
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a new approach to the problem of sex-based intrusions, an approach that
reflects both historical concerns associated with an amorphous doctrine
of privacy and a woman-centered persective.
This article labels the portrayal of these seven women "pornog-
raphy," because they involve the graphic depiction of women as whores,
the original meaning of pornography.2 6 Recognizing the connection
between these portrayals, and the definition of pornography, serves two
purposes. First, it emphasizes the widespread and injurious" depiction of
women as whores in our society outside the traditional sphere commonly
recognized as pornography. Second, it facilitates challenging some of the
assumptions that underlie the traditional consideration of pornography
as only a question of free speech.2"
Many commentators view pornography as solely a free speech
issue. That approach assumes pornography is harmless and must be
scene in a magazine and in advertisements for the magazine.); Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d
636 (2nd Cir. 1980) (vacating and remanding judgment dismissing diversity action against
publisher who had published book in which a woman with plaintiffs name was lured into
"untoward sexual conduct which is graphically portrayed").
By contrast, men who bring similar actions are often successful See, e.g., Ali v.
Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (obtaining a preliminary injunction to
restrain publisher from distributing all copies of the magazine in England and New York
that contained a drawing of a nude Black man seated in the corner of a boxing ring with a
caption describing him as'the Greatest'); Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (men alleging injury for description of them as "faggots" and "fairies"); Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). See also note 32 infra.
26. 7 Oxford English Dictionary 1131 (1933). Courts and feminist scholars have
recognized this literal definition. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 n.2
(1973); A. Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women 9 (1981); Steinem, Erotica
and Pornography: A Clear and Present Difference in Take Back the Night: Women on
Pornography 37(L Lederer ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Take Back the Night]. United
States v. Thevis, 484 F.2d 1149, 1152, n.3 (5th Cir. 1973).
27. The injury from pornography is two-fold. First, the women being depicted are
injured through the exploitation and objectification of their sexuality. Second, all women are
injured through the perpetuation of a culture of sexual objectification which can only
comprehend women as sex objects. See infra note 55 and text accompanying note 50. See
also A. Dworkin, supra note 26. Cf. Delgado, Words that Woun& A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, and Name.Calling,17 Harv. C.R.-C.L L Rev. 133 (1982) (discussing
injury of racial epithets).
28. Pornography pervades society, whether it be hard-core, soft-core, art, or advertising.
Hard-core pornography depicts women as willing, ready prey for men's sexual pleasures;
art often exhibits women's bodies to entice male viewers; advertising often displays women
to help sell a product. "Pornography becomes difficult to distinguish from art and ads once it
is clear that what is degrading to women is compelling to the consumer." MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State, 7 Signs 515, 532 (1982). Pornography's
success depends upon its many pervasive forms going unmentioned, even unnoticed, and
the oppression of the women portrayed remaining unrecognized. See generally P. Freire,
Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970); All the Women are White, All the Blacks are Men, But
Some of Us are Brave (G. Hull, P. Scott & B. Smith eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as But
[Vol 1:191
1983] PORNOGRAPHY& PRIVACY
protected to safeguard representative democracy.2 9 Women's lack of
participation and representation in our purportedly democratic insti-
tutions, and specifically women's lack of freedom within the pornography
industry, have never entered the free speech debate."s This article brings
those issues to the forefront.
Some of Us are Brave]; A. Rich, On Lies, Secrets, and Silence (1979); T. Olsen, Silences
(1978); Nice Jewish Girls (E. Beck ed. 1982) (documenting various aspects of Western
methodology and the silence of oppressed groups).
Methodologically, Adrienne Rich attributes women's invisibility to the fact that the
questions raised are:.
inevitably male questions, posed in a worldview and an ethical system which
has persistently denied moral and ethical value to women, viewing us always
as marginal, dubious, or dangerous, and in need of special controls.
A. Rich, supra at 16. See also M. Daly, Beyond God the Father 11-16 (1973) (challenging
women to ask what patriarchy considers to be "nonquestions").
Women's studies attempts to help women escape invisibility. Nevertheless, this
body of scholarly work has been criticized for ignoring the lives of ordinary women,
particularly ordinary women of color. See, e.g., Hull & Smith, Introduction" The Politics of
Black Women's Studies, in But Some of Us Are Brave, supra at xxi.
29. The first amendment to the United States Constitution states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press ...
U.S. Const., amend. 1. The question in cases involving any regulation of pornography is
whether the phrase "no law" must be interpreted literally or whether a balancing test would
be more appropriate. Although courts and commentators disagree as to the exact test that
should be imposed, see infra note 30, they generally agree that the first amendment's
protection of free speech should be the primary focus of concern. Because the purpose of the
first amendment is said to be protection of the lively debate necessary to a representative
democracy, commentators and courts tie the protection of pornography to the protection of
representative democracy. See, e.g., Fahringer, Obscenity Law: Who Will Guard the
Guards?, Trial Aug. 1980, at 20 (arguing that free speech must be a universal concept to
maintain a representative form of government).
30. The legal standard for determining whether pornography is protected under the first
amendment was set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973):
(a) whether the "average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest . . . ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.
Material that satisfies each part of theMiller test is considered to be "obscene" and thereby
unprotected by the first amendment
The focus of theMiller criteria is the community's standards for morality rather than
the potential danger of pornography to society. In all of its pornography decisions the
Supreme Court has assumed that the argument that "exposure to obscene materials
adversely affects men and women" is an unprovable assumption. See, e.g., Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1973). That view derives, in large part, from the
Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (1970). But see Russell,
Pornography and Violence: "hat Does the New Research Say? in Take Back the Night,
supra note 26, at 218-38 (presenting evidence of the harm of pornography).
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i. Privacy Doctrine
Historically, privacy doctrine3 evolved to protect people from
offensive intrusions, particularly intrusions that affected their inter-
personal relationships. But in fact, this article will show that it has served
to protect existing forms of interrelations such as the family and
traditional heterosexuality, including women's oppression within those
relations. Privacy doctrine has confined women" to the private sphere,
beyond the reach of public law, beyond protection from offensive
intrusions. Specifically, privacy doctrine has failed to aid the victims of
See also Fahringer, supra note 29; Rosen, Changing Standards of Obscenity in
Texas, 34 Sw. LJ. 1201-27 (1981); Stone, Obscenity Law Reform: Some Practical
Problems, 130 New LJ. 872 (1980); Yaffe, The Law Relating to Pornography: A
Psychological Overview, 20 Med. Sci. & Law 20-27 (1980); Note, Texas'New Obscenity
Laws: Redefining Taste, 17 Hous. L Rev. 835 (1980); Comment, ObscenityLaw ln Ohio,
13 Akron L Rev. 520 (1980); Comment, Pennsylvania Obscenity Law: A Pornographer's
Delight, 41 U. Pitt. L Rev. 251 (1980) (assuming that pornography is not harmful and
should be protected as a part of protecting free speech). But see Bryant, Sexual Display of
Women's Bodies-A Violation ofPrivacy, 10 Golden Gate U. L Rev. 1211 (1980) (privacy
analysis); Gerety, Pornograpy and Violence, 40 U. Pitt. L Rev. 627 (1979) (violence
analysis).
31. "Privacy doctrine" refers to the various doctrines that have emerged from law's
consideration of privacy-related issues. Its existence encompasses both formal (e.g.
jurisprudential rules) and informal (e.g. social rules) uses of law because law penetrates all
aspects of society.
32. "Women" refers to all women although each woman's individual experience may
differ. See, eg., But Some of Us are Brave, supra note 28; A. Davis, supra note 19; Murray,
The Liberation of Black Women, in Voices of the New Feminism (M. Thompson ed. 1975)
(documenting the specific experience of women).
As Catharine MacKinnon has noted, the use of the word "woman" in feminist theory
must include all women "in some way, without violating the particularity of any woman's
experience. Whenever this fails, the statement is simply wrong and will have to be qualified
or the aspiration (or the theory) abandoned." MacKinnon, supra note 28, at 520 n.7.
"Woman" is a gender, not a biological classification. It therefore only refers to
female-born, not transsexual, women. See generally J. Raymond, The Transsexual
Empire (1979) (arguing that the phenomenon of transsexuality is a product of patri-
archy).
This article does not claim that its theory could apply to men who are portrayed
pornographically, because men, traditionally, have not been and are not now sex objects in
our society. Interestingly, in the only closely analogous case involving a man, a porno-
graphic portrayal and a privacy action, Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y.
1978), Mohammed Ali was successful in obtaining a preliminary injunction to restrain a
publisher from distributing all copies of the offensive magazine in England as well as New
York. (Playgirl Magazine had printed a drawing of a nude Black man seated in the corner of
a boxing ring with an accompanying verse which described him as "the GreatesL") The
court granted Ali the desired injunction finding that he was likely to succeed on the merits
because: (1) he was not a public figure in the context of the portrayal, and (2) his right of
publicity or privacy was invaded by the offensive depiction. Id. at 727-28. As we will see,
courts systematically draw the opposite conclusion for female plaintiffs.
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sex-based intrusions.3 The seven cases highlighted in this article
exemplify that failure.
Privacy doctrine pervades many areas of law: legal theory, tort law,
and constitutional law. It also pervades women's oppression under
patriarchy.34 It preserves, protects, strengthens, masks, hides, distorts,
and reflects women's sexual abuse. Its central role-control of women's
sexuality, of intimate, sensitive spheres of interaction-has gone un-
recognized.
This article examines that role in the context of women's complaints
for invasion of privacy for sex-based intrusions. It traces how privacy
doctrine has failed to respond to flagrant abuses of women's sexuality."
Four major themes emerge from this analysis. First, a false public/
private distinction pervades privacy doctrine. That distinction pretends
that women share men's public power and men's privilege of choosing
privacy.
Second, law fails to recognize that privacy is compulsory for women
while a privilege for men. Compulsory privacy makes women invisible36
while mythicizing," distorting, and obscuring them.3" It imposes power-
lessness on women throughout society including within the public
33. See injra section 11 of this article.
34. "Patriarchy" refers to a society in which males control females. That control
relegates women to a position of powerlessness, in both the private and public spheres.
Adrienne Rich has defined patriarchy in its relationship to the false privatization of women's
lives.
By I patriarchy] I mean to imply not simply the tracing of descent through the
father, which anthropologists seem to agree is a relatively late phenomenon,
but any kind of group organization in which males hold dominant power and
determine which part females shall and shall not play, and in which
capabilities assigned to women are relegated generally to the mystical and
aesthetic and excluded from the practical and political realms. (It is
characteristic of patriarchal thinking that these realms are regarded as
separate and mutually exclusive.)
A. Rich. supra note 28, at 78.
Both men and women contribute to the survival of patriarchy by transmitting male
values throughout society and from one generation to another. See, e.g., M. Daly, supra note
28, at 125 (referring to lesbians' transmission of traditional sex role values through role
playing): Hull & Smith, Introduction: The Politics of Black Women's Studies, in But Some
of Us are Brave, supra note 28 (referring to patriarchal values within women's studies).
35. "'Privacy doctrine" is a legal term. It isnot what feminists mean when they refer to the
private or personal in the statement, "the personal is political." Feminists challenge the
distinction between the private and the public, whereas law perpetuates it. Feminists, gays,
and lesbians, however, have not always understood that privacy doctrine is alien to their
notion of privacy; instead, they have often sought to use privacy doctrine to free themselves
from oppression. Those attempts are, at best, misguided. See, e.g., infra section II.
36. See supra note 28.
37. See generally M. Daly. Gyn/Ecology 151-52 (1978) (exploring the relationship
between the story of Cinderella and a foot-binding ideology); A. Dworkin. Woman Hating
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sphere, which it defines by distinction. It confines women to a sphere
beyond the protection of law, even beyond the protection of privacy
doctrine.
Third, privacy doctrine is premised on an individual-based
perspective. That perspective cannot comprehend that women's inability
to gain public power or to choose privacy is an aspect of their power-
lessness as women. It cannot comprehend the existence of an action by a
woman, as a member of the group-women. Privacy doctrine, like all of
law, 9 uses an individual-based perspective that denies the existence or
importance of group-based theory. Only group-based theory can help
women escape from compulsory privacy. 0
Fourth, compulsory privacy supports the norms of male power. It
imposes the norms of heterosexuality on women while making the women
who complain of sexual abuse seem either undeserving or super-
sensitive.' It precludes both traditional and untraditional women from
obtaining legal relief for invasion of privacy, while preserving the norms
which make their oppression possible.
This article first examines the historical emergence of privacy
doctrine by looking at four diverse influences on the doctrine: (1) Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis' theoretical work; (2) Herbert Hart, Albert
Sacks, and Lon Fuller's theoretical work; (3) William Prosser's doctrinal
work- and (4) constitutional case law. It then examines the doctrine's
application to women's complaints for invasion of privacy. Finally, the
29-49 (1974) (exploring the woman-hating symbols within Sleeping Beauty, Cinderella,
and Snow White, and other fairy tales; connecting those images to pornography); M. Daly,
supra note 28, at 44-68 (1973) (exploring the story of Eve). But see Merseyside Women's
literature Collective, Snow White, in Hard Feelings 27-35 (A. Fell ed. 1979) (re-writing
fairy tale with more positive female images). Compare Z. Budapest, The Holy Book of
Women's Mysteries Part II, 197 (1980) (creating a feminist spirituality yet blaming Jews for
killing the goddess), with Beck, Why Is This Book Different From All OtherBooks?, in Nice
Jewish Girls supra note 28, at xix-xx (criticizing Budapest's work for its anti-Semitism).
38. 1 thank Vicky Bergvall for helping me to realize that mythification does not
necessarily include distortion.
39. Even the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution is basically
concerned with fairness to individuals rather than fairness to groups. The only sources of
group-based theory within the Constitution, as will be discussed later, are the thirteenth and
nineteenth amendments. Both amendments recognize that certain groups have a history of
servitude or partial citizenship. See infra text accompanying notes 186-91. The right to
treatment as an equal is often characterized as the right of "each individual" to receive
"equal regard as a person." L Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-1, at 993
(1978).
40. This article argues for a group-based privacy doctrine. This idea of "group privacy"
is not original to me, although no one else has analyzed it in the way I have in this article. I
first heard of the concept in a Harvard Law School class taught by Professor Catharine
MacKinnon. MacKinnon first mentioned the phrase and it was further developed by class
members, particularly William Fleming. See also Bryant, supra note 30, at 1211.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 149-69.
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article suggests a new approach to those complaints-one that uses a
group-based perspective.
A. Warren and Brandeis
Modem privacy doctrine derives from Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis' pioneering work, The Right to Privacy, which expanded a
property-based doctrine into a person-based doctrine encompassing
thoughts, emotions, and sensations.' 2 Warren and Brandeis sought to
maintain a minimum level of decency in a society threatened by
developing mass technology. They thought a person-based right of
privacy could help protect civilization against the onslaught of modern
enterprise and invention. 43
Warren and Brandeis recognized the media as a very powerful force
in society, influencing basic moral standards. They understood that
individuals portrayed by the media needed protection from that powerful
institution. Their basic concerns and conceptualizations parallel many
feminists' descriptions of female sexual objectification through pornog-
raphy. Nevertheless, their work is bound by certain assumptions which
have limited its usefulness to the victims of sexual abuse, particularly of
pornography.
Warren and Brandeis believed a right to privacy would help protect
society from the spread of "personal gossip" by the modern media. They
felt such gossip was destroying the moral fabric of society.
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.
To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread
broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. . . . [Mlodern
enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon [a person's]
privacy, subjected him [sic] to mental pain and distress, far greater
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. Nor is the harm
wrought by such invasions confined to the suffering of those who
may be made the subjects of journalistic or other enterprise. In this,
as in other branches of commerce, the supply creates the demand.
Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of
more, and, in direct proportion to its circulation, results in a
42. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy
, 
4 Harv. L Rev. 193 (1890). They argued
that the "right to life" doctrine had:
come to mean the right to enjoy life, -the right to be let alone; the right to
liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil privileges; and the term
.'property" has grown to comprise every form of possession- intangible, as
well as tangible.
d. at 193.
43. Id. at 195-96.
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lowering of social standards and of morality. Even gossip apparent-
ly harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for
evil It both belittles and perverts."
Although Warren and Brandeis labeled the problem "personal
gossip," they clearly had in mind the problems of female sexual abuse
which this article terms pornography. To demonstrate the need for a right
to privacy, they cited the case of Marion Manola v. Stevens & Myers.
41
Manola, an actress, had been photographed surreptitiously while appear-
ing on Broadway playing a role which required her to wear tights. She
brought an action to enjoin the photographer's use of the photograph.
Warren and Brandeis mentioned the case to show that privacy issues,
related to the recent advent of "numerous mechanical devices," 46 were
emerging in the courts.
The harm of these recent inventions, according to Warren and
Brandeis, was the "inva[sion of] the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life. . . . " They labeled the problem "personal gossip"
because it "threaten[ed] to make good the prediction that 'what is
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.' "14
The harm, according to Warren and Brandeis, extended to both the
individual portrayed and society at large. "[M]odern enterprise and
invention have, through invasions upon [the portrayed individual's]
privacy, subjected him [sic] to mental pain and distress, far greater than
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury."" They considered the injury to
society at large to be even more devastating.
[Gossip] belittles by inverting the relative importance of things,
thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people ...
Triviality destroys at once robustness of thought and delicacy of
feeling. No enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can
survive under its blighting influence.'
Although Warren and Brandeis recognized a harm to both the
individual portrayed and society as a whole, they created a cause of action
only for the individual portrayed. A tension concerning the significance of
the injury to society as a whole underlies their work. On the one hand,
they labeled the problem "personal gossip" and created only a right of
"privacy" for the individual portrayed. On the other hand, they
recognized both the public implications of the injury and the way that
44. Id. at 196.
45. N.Y. Times, June 15, 18, 21, 1890.
46. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 42, at 195 n.7.
47. Id. at 195.
48. Id. at 196.
49. Id.
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privacy and publicity can be intertwined (for example, the public
portrayal of Manola's private sexuality). As we shall see, however,
privacy doctrine case law has developed in complete isolation from
Warren and Brandeis' recognition of the harm to society as a whole. The
modem doctrine codifies a very strong, although artificial, distinction
between the public and private, and fails to recognize how these arenas are
often intertwined. It has helped protect pornography rather than destroy
it.
Many feminists agree with Warren and Brandeis that depictions
like Manola's (which this article recognizes to be pornography) harm both
the individual portrayed and society as a whole. Pornography treats the
individual portrayed as a nonperson or an object and helps create and
perpetuate a sexually objectifying and sadistic culture.
[1lt is claimed that no one is being violated, that no one's rights are
being abrogated; therefore the one who is the object of cultural
sadism (the ideology of pornography) does not exist as a person.
With its objects or victims defined as nonpersons, cultural sadism is
a sanctioned right."
Despite these parallels with radical feminist concerns, two aspects
of Warren and Brandeis' work limit its usefulness. First, Warren and
Brandeis only recognized one-half of the interconnection between the
public and the private. They described how private matters can enter the
public sphere without consent" But they failed to recognize that
movement can also occur in the other direction. Public power can also
enter the private sphere, injuring the person acted upon.52 For instance,
50. K. Barry, Female Sexual Slavery 211 (1979).
51. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 42, at 195.
52. The feminist expression, "the personal is political," challenging the public/private
distinction, is commonly used in feminist circles, but has rarely been explained. Catharine
MacKinnon has offered the following explanation:
Relinquishing all instinctual, natural, transcendental, and divine authority,
this concept grounds women' s sexuality on purely relational terrain, anchor.
ing women's powerand accounting forwomen's discontent in the same world
they stand against. The personal as political is not a simile, not a metaphor,
and not an analogy .... It means that women's distinctive experience as
women occurs within that sphere that has been socially lived as the
personal- private, emotional, interiorized, particular, individuated, in-
timate-so that what it is toknow thepolitics of woman's situation is to know
women's personal lives.
The substantive principle governing the authentic politics of women's
personal lives is pervasive powerlessness to men, expressed and recon-
stituted daily as sexuality. To say that the personal is political means that
gender ass division of power is discoverable and verifiable through women's
intimate experience of sexual objectification, which is definitive of and
synonymous with women's lives as gender female. Thus, to feminism, the
personal is epistemologically the political, and its epistemology is its
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victims of wife battery, incest, and rape are victims of men's use of public
power within the private sphere. Understanding this two-directional
movement is critical to understanding how women are systematically
disempowered within both the public and private spheres. By contrast,
Warren and Brandeis' exclusive focus on only one half of the problem has
served to further romanticize the safety of the private sphere. They
assumed that Manola had a privacy to lose. An examination of the private
sphere within which she lived as a woman would reveal that she did
not."
Second, Warren and Brandeis assumed that less powerful groups
would want to maintain the current social standards and norms of
morality. The harm of gossip, in their view, was its lowering of social
standards and morality."
Radical feminists argue,by contrast, that pornography reflects the
norms of sexuality and morality. They view the sexually objectifying
message of pornography-"that women are natural sexual prey to men
and love it"-as a reflection of male control over sexuality within
traditional heterosexuality. 5 They seek to expose the congruence
politics.
MacKinnon, supra note 28, at 534-35.
See also Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence in Women-
Sex and Sexuality 62 (C. Stimpson & E. Person eds. 1980) ("By the same token, we can say
that there is a nascent feminist political content in the act of choosing a woman lover or life
partner in the face of institutionalized heterosexuality.").
The feminist critique of the public/private distinction is basic to the feminist attempt
to criticize the norms of sexuality and relate those norms to women's oppression in all
spheres (e.g., the workplace via sexual harassment or the bedroom via wife battery). A sharp
public-private distinction prevents the argument that sexuality, a supposedly personal or
private concept, is a part of women's existence everywhere, an argument central to this
article.
53. E.g., Rich, supra at note 28; A. Rich, Of Woman Born (1976).
54. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 42, at 196.
55. Rich, supra note 52, at 62. In context, Rich's full statement is as follows:
The most pernicious message relayed by pornography is that women are
natural sexual prey to men and love it; that sexuality and violence are
congruent; and that for women sex is essentially masochistic, humiliation
pleasurable, physical abuse erotic. But along with this message comes
another, not always recognized: that enforced submission and the use of
cruelty, if played out in heterosexual pairing, is sexually "'normal," while
sensuality between women, including erotic mutuality and respect. is
"queer," "sick," and either pornographic in itself or not very exciting
compared with the sexuality of whips and bondage. Pornography does not
simply create a climate in which sex and violence are interchangeable; it
widens the range of behavior considered acceptable from men in hetero-
sexual intercourse-behavior which reiteratively strips women of their
autonomy, dignity, and sexual potential, including the potential of loving
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between normal sexuality, power, and violence; and they believe society's
norms should be changed rather than protected. Warren and Brandeis
sought to return to an earlier morality whereas feminists look forward to
the creation of a new morality.
5 6
B. Hart, Sacks, and Fuller
The works of Herbert Hart, Albert Sacks,5 and Lon Fuller"8
introduced a strong concern for rational, individual-based decision
making into modern privacy doctrine, further limiting the doctrine's
ability to provide an effective remedy for women. An outgrowth of their
work has been the development of a strong public/private distinction
defining where law should intrude, with the domestic sphere of human
relationships falling outside the concern of the law. This public/private
distinction places interpersonal relationships on a pedestal while con-
sidering them too trivial for the law's intrusion. This distinction precludes
women from using law to escape interpersonal forms of oppression.
Fuller explained the rationale behind this sharp public/private
distinction within jurisprudence.
Adjudication is not a proper form of social ordering where the
effectiveness of human association would be destroyed if it were
organized about formally defined "rights" and "wrongs." Courts
have, for example, rather regularly refused to enforce agreements
between husband and wife affecting the internal organization of
and being loved by women in mutuality and integrity.
Id. at 72.
This article accepts Rich's premise that pornographic interactions are the norm of
sexuality. This article does not presume that erotic mutuality and respect is yet possible,
even among women. See generally MacKinnon, supra note 28 (questioning the existence of
an authentic female sexuality).
56. This article uses the phrase "moral arguments" to refer to any argument based on
moral considerations including unorthodox arguments that seek to change society
fundamentally. Feminists often shun moral arguments for fear of being labeled moralistic.
To be moralistic is to attempt to preserve the status quo. For instance, Tom Gerety has often
criticized the radical feminist attempt to cast the pornography debate in moral terms,
assuming that moral arguments must be moralistic, i.e., try to preserve traditional values.
See, e.g., Gerety, supra note 30, at 639-40. He, like Warren and Brandeis, has made a false
assumption that moral arguments can only be used to maintain the status quo. Moral
arguments that criticize the norms of conventional morality and sexuality must be the first
step in women's liberation rather than a step to be avoided out of fear of being labeled
moralistic. Only by recognizing that power and morality are interconnected, can feminists
hope to succeed in attacking the patriarchal power structure, of which pornography is but
one pernicious example.
57. H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and
Application of Law (tentative ed. 1957). See also Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L Rev. 1, 19 (1959) (defining "principled decisions").
58. Fuller, The Eorms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L Rev. 353 (1978).
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family life. . . . Wherever successful human association depends
upon spontaneous and informal collaboration, shifting its forms
with the task at hand, there adjudication is out of place except as it
may declare certain ground rules applicable to a wide variety of
activities.
These are vague and perhaps trite observations. . . . [At their
root] lies the fundamental truth that certain kinds of human
relations are not appropriate raw material for a process of decision
that is institutionally committed to acting on the basis of reasoned
argument.5 9
This sharp public/private distinction rejects the view that interpersonal
relationships can be a public problem, especially when society's basic
moral standards are at stake. Such a sharp distinction narrows the
application of Warren and Brandeis' theory. Specifically, it undercuts
Warren and Brandeis' recognition that issues of privacy can enter the
public sphere. It also reinforces the failure of Warren and Brandeis to
recognize that public power can enter the private sphere. In challenging
the public/private distinction, this article considers both the public
influences on the private and the private influences on the public.
Further, it assumes that a husband and wife have equal power
within the domestic sphere, ignoring the sharp differences in power
between them. That assumption is an implicit part of an individual-based
perspective because it fails to see that the power of a husband is partly due
to his membership in the group of men. Similarly, the wife's power-
lessness is linked to her membership in the group of women. An
individual-based perspective denies the significance of that group
membership.
The public/private distinction has also led to the courts' refusal to
enforce agreements between husbands and wives, contributing to the
acceptance and enforcement of the status quo. This preservation of the
status quo deters feminist attempts to change societal norms.
C. Prosser
William Prosser's work narrowed privacy doctrine as a remedy for
women injured by pornographic intrusions. 60 Prosser divided privacy
doctrine into four distinct invasions of four different interests: (1) appro-
priation of plaintiff's name or likeness for defendant's benefit or
advantage; (2) intrusion upon plaintiff's physical solitude or seclusion;
59. Id. at 370-71. See also H. Hart & A. Sacks, supra note 57, at 5 (defining as
appropriate questions for law-"every kind of question affecting the group's internal
relations, and every kind of question affecting its external relations which the group can
establish competence to deal with").
60. W. Prosser, supra note 24, § 117.
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(3) public disclosure of private facts about plaintiff; and (4) publicity
which places plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 6 1 Prosser believed
these four specific intrusions had little in common except for a relation to
Warren and Brandeis' concept of "the right to be left alone."'6 This highly
particularized development of modern privacy doctrine has no social or
historical underpinnings. As such, it articulates an individual-based
perspective. It has taken the doctrine even further from Warren and
Brandeis' basic concerns about the problems of powerful institutions. It
has erected barriers to relief at the initial stages of a lawsuit when a women
tries to explain her injury from pornography, and at the final stages when
she tries to recover a full damage award.
D. Constitutional Case Law
Constitutional case law has also made privacy doctrine an in-
effective tool for redressing women's injuries. Although the right to
privacy does not explicitly appear in the Constitution, seemingly
unrelated court decisions have recognized that doctrine. Constitutional
case law, in its desire to protect traditional norms, has also adopted an
,artificially sharp public/private distinction which severely limits its
usefulness to women. Similarly, that sharp distinction also exists in
defamation actions.
1. Roe v. Wade
A constitutional right of privacy first annuciated in Griswold v.
Connecticut63 developed in Roe v. Wade. " In Roe, the Court found the
-right of privacy to be broad enough to encompass a woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy.
61. The four causes of action differ considerably:
The first and second require the invasion of something secret, secluded or
private pertaining to the plaintiff; the third and fourth do not. The second and
third depend upon publicity, while the first does not, nor does the fourth,
although it usually involves it. The third requires falsity or fiction; the other
three do not. The fourth involves a use for the defendant's advantage, which
is not true of the rest.
-d. § 117, at814.
There are also some similarities. The plaintiffs right is always a personal one, it is not
assignable, and there is no comon law right of action for a publication concerning one who is
already dead.
62. Id. § 117.
63. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Roe's progeny: Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494 (1977); Carey v. Population Sevices Int'L 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S. Ct.
2481 (1983); Planned Parenthood Asa'n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Asheraf 103 S. Ct.
2517 (1982); Simopoulos v. Va., 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
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Extrapolating from several different sources within the Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court found a constitutional right of privacy that
protects the traditional areas of marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education.6 5 The concept of
traditional norms was crucial to the Court's decision. The Court preceded
its Roe holding with a lengthy examination of the rules proscribing
abortion and concluded they were not of ancient or common law origin.6
Traditionally, the Court claimed, abortion was the prerogative of the
family: state proscription of abortion was untraditional. It therefore held
that privacy doctrine, in preserving traditional norms, protects a
woman's decision regarding pregnancy.
The'traditional basis of the Court's decision reinforces the arti-
ficially sharp public/private distinction and fails to benefit women who do
not fit within the accepted norms of society. 6' The Court reiterated
Fuller's rationale for defining the boundaries of law. It assumed the
traditional family deserved absolute protection from state intrusion. Left
outside those boundaries are women oppressed within the traditional
family, for example, women who must endure wife battery, 6 marital
rape,69 incest,70 and involuntary sterilization." Left outside also are
women who need abortions but do not belong to the white, middle-class
family, and cannot afford to purchase them.72 Left outside are the
contours of women's group-based oppression-the traditional roles that
are imposed on women.
The right to privacy developed in Roe differs considerably from the
65. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
66. Id. at 133-52.
67. See, e.g., H. L v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (restricting minor's right to have
an abortion); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (restricting poor women's opportunity
to have an abortion). See also A. Davis, supra note 19 (criticizing abortion movement's
failure to aid poor women and women of color).
68. Note, Domestic Violence: Legislative andJudicial Remedies, 2 Harv. Women's L J.
167 (1979).
69. Id.
70. See generally Comment, Iowa's Inadequate Protection Against Child Molesting,
66 Iowa L Rev. 623 (1981); D. Finkelhor, Sexually Victimized Children (1979); F. Rush,
The Best Kept Secret: Sexual Abuse of Children (1981); Rush, Child Pornography, in Take
Back the Night, supra note 26. See also State v. Baldwin, 291 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa 1980)
(fondling of breasts of a twelve year old girl not coming within statutory definition of
proscribed "sex act"); Bolin v. State, 505 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Crim. 1974) (father forcing
daughter to have sexual intercourse with him in exchange for grocery money for her and her
two brothers; not constituting statutory rape because daughter's testimony, alone,
insufficient); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d411 (1980) (providing historical discussion
of sanctity of home being more important than rape or incest convictions). C.f A. Dworkin,
supra note 26, at 56 (discussing why society ignores sexual abuse of female children).
71. See generally A. Davis, supra note 19, at 215-21.
72. See supra note 67.
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invasion of privacy doctrine developed by Warren and Brandeis, and
specifically conceptualized by Prosser. Both, however, focus on tradi-
tional, moral and social norms. The Roe decision makes Warren and
Brandeis' underlying concern for traditional social norms quite explicit.
This concern is one reason why women's claims of privacy for porno-
graphic intrusions have failed.
2. Stanley v. Georgia
A similar right to privacy had been recognized previously in
Stanley v. Georgia." Holding that the first and fourteenth Amendments
prohibited making the mere private possession of obscene material a
crime, the Supreme Court said:
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas. . . . This right to receive informa-
tion and ideas, regardless of their social worth, . . . is funda-
mental to our free society. Moreover, in the context of this case-a
prosecution for mere possession [in] the privacy of a person's own
home-that right takes on an added dimension. For also funda-
mental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy ...
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating
obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own
home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government
the power to control men's minds. 4
The Court distinguished Roth v. United States," an earlier case
sustaining the validity of Federal and state obscenity laws which outlawed
the selling of obscene material. In Roth, the Court rejected the necessity of
proving that exposure to obscene material would create a clear and
present danger of anti-social conduct or would probably induce its
recipients to engage in such conduct.7 6 It found sufficient justification in
the assertion that the material might fall into the hands of children or that
it might intrude upon the sensibilities or privacy of the general public."
Its concern about social harm could be considered a group-based
concern. It certainly recognized the dangers children face as a group.
By contrast, the Court in Stanley rejected the idea that the
73. 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
74. Id. at 564-65.
75. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
76. Id. at 486.
77. Id. at 490, at 510 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also New York v. Ferber, 102 S. CL
3348, 3353 (1982).
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possibility of social harm or injury to a certain group could justify
regulation. It found that private possession of pornography posed none of
the potential harms present in Roth, including the possibility that
obscene material might fall into the hands of children. 8 It rejected the
significance of Roth's group-based concerns.
Since Stanley, the Court has been quite clear that the Constitution
only protects pornography within the private sanctuary of the home.
Outside the home, the state may regulate material that is obscene under a
standard set forth by the Court in Miller v. California.9 The Court in
Stanley, as in Roe, assumed that the home is a sanctuary free from the
need for societal protection. 0 Stanley provides a powerful example of the
courts permitting men to bring their public power into the purportedly
private sphere, under the guise of privacy doctrine.8 '
3. Defamation Law
A public/private distinction has also developed in defamation
law.8 In the landmark case of N. Y Times v. Sullivan,"3 the Supreme
Court held that a public official must prove actual malice before liability
will ensue in a defamation action against critics of his or her official
conduct.
Sullivan, an Alabama police commissioner, objected to his por-
trayal in a New York Times advertisement soliciting funds to defend
Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement in the South. The
advertisement contained several minor inaccuracies. While Sullivan was
not specifically named in the advertisement, the Alabama police were
accused of racial harassment and brutality. Sullivan sought general and
punitive damages for libel. The case was part of the controversy between
the Alabama "white establishment" and the Black opposition to racial
78. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1969).
79. See generally supra note 30 (Miller obscenity standard). 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See,
e.g., United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (197 1) (upholding federal law that prohibited the
mailing of obscene material).
80. Acceptance of that false assumption in Stanley led to an equally incorrect one: there
is no danger that obscene material might fall into the hands of children within the home. In
fact, it is probably at least as easy (or maybe easier) for a child to steal pornography from his
or her parent(s)' bedroom than to purchase pornography in the marketplace. Some parents
may even freely give their children obscene material.
81. This article will explore that concept in more detail in Section II. It is central to
understanding that women, by contrast, bring powerlessness into the public sphere.
82. "Defamation is. . . . that which tends to injure'reputation'in the popular sense; to
diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which plaintiff is held or to excite
adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him." Prosser. supra note 24,
at § 111, 739 (footnotes omitted).
83. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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segregation and police brutality. 4 TheNew York Times served as a forum
for the controversy.
Under Alabama state law, the statements in the advertisement were
libelousper se and were not privileged. General damages therefore could
be awarded without proof of actual injury, because the law presumed legal
injury from the act of publication itself. The jury awarded Sullivan a half-
million dollar judgment.
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, relying
heavily on freedom of speech. The majority opinion stated that letting the
judgment stand would "threaten the very existence of an American press
virile enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold
enough to criticize the conduct of public officials."8
Subsequently, the Court applied the New York Times actual malice
standard to "public figures." The Court included in that category a retired
Army general, 86 a university athletic director,8" a court clerk,8 a state
representative and real estate developer,89 a defeated candidate for tax
assessor,9" and a candidate for United States Senate.'
In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,9 a sharply divided Court extended
the New York Times standard to private individuals involved in an event
of public or general interest. 93 Four years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,94 Rosenbloom was overruled.
Gertz, a liberal lawyer, had served as the attorney for the family of a
youth allegedly murdered by the Chicago police. He represented the
family in a civil action against the police. American Opinion, a monthly
publication of the John Birch Society, printed an article entitled,
"FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And The War on Police."' The article
84. [TI he inescapable conclusion was that Alabama's 'white establishment' had
taken the opportunity to punish the New York Times for its support of civil
rights activists: the South was prepared to use the law of libel to stifle black
opposition to racial segregation.
L Tribe, supra note 39, § 12-12, at 633 (citing Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note
on 'The Central Meaning of the First Amendment,* 1964 Sup. CL Rev. 191, 200).
85. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964).
86. Association Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
87. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
88. Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
89. Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
90. Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
91. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
92. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
93. Id. at 47 ("If the States fear that private citizens will not be able to respond
adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of ensuring their
ability to respond, rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public con-
cern.").
94. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
95. Id. at 325, 326.
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described Gertz as an architect of the frameup. It inaccurately stated that
he had a lengthy crimiinal record, was a member of a revolutionary
Marxist league, a Leninist and a Communist fronter.
Under Illinois law, ;he statements constituted libelper se relieving
Gertz of the obligation of proving special damages. Although the jury
awarded Gertz $50,000, the district court entered judgment for defen-
dant notwithstanding the jury's verdict, in light of New York Times v.
Sullivan.
The Supreme Court held that the New York Times actual malice
standard did not apply to Gertz as a private individual. Hence, it created a
public/private distinction. Two factors influenced the Court's decision.
First, the Court found that private individuals were "more vulnerable to
injury, and the state interest in protecting them was correspondingly
greater""' than the state interest in protecting public officials.9 Second,
the Court concluded that there was less societal interest in protecting free
speech when the individuals defamed have not voluntarily thrust
themselves into the reported controversies. The private individual, the
Court concluded, "has relinquished no part of his [or her] interest in the
protection of his [or her] own good name, and consequently he [or she]
has a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by
defamatory falsehood." '
Gertz emphasized the concepts of voluntariness and the oppor-
tunity for effective rebuttal in its constitutional analysis of defamation
law. 99 Nevertheless, courts have not adequately considered these con-
96. Id. at 344.
97. Compare Rosenbloom's plurality opinion:
In the vast majority of libels involving public officials or public figures. the
ability to respond through the media will depend on the same complex factor
on which the ability of a private individual depends: the unpredictable event
of the media's continuing interest in the story. Thus the unproved, and
highly improbable, generalization that an as yet undefined class of "public
figures" involved in matters of public concern will be better able to respond
through the media than private individuals also involved in such matters
seems too insubstantial a reed on which to rest a constitutional dis-
tinction.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1970).
98. Gertz. 418 U.S. at 345. Compare Rosenbloom's plurality opinion:
We have recognized that- [e) xposure of the self to others in varying degrees
is a concomitant of life in a civilized community." Time, Inc. r. Hill. 385
U.S. 374, 388 (1967). Voluntarily or not. we are all "public" men [sic] to
some degree. . . . Thus. the idea that certain "public" figures have
voluntarily exposed their entire lives to public inspection. while private
individuals have kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is. at best. a
legal fiction.
Rosenbloom. 403 U.S. at 47-48.
99. See. e.g.. L Tribe. supro note 39. § 12-12.
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cepts when deciding defamation cases brought by women who have been
the victims of sexual abnse.
The public/private distinction that emerges inNew York Times and
Gertz is problematic based on the facts of those cases. Both the police
commissioner in New York Times and the lawyer in Gertz were acting in
capacities of public power, as well as private powerlessness. Although the
police commissioner was a public official, he probably lacked the
resources to rebut effectively an advertisement in the New York Times.
The lawyer in Gertz was licensed by the state to practice law in a public
forum yet he probably lacked the resources to rebut effectively an article
inAmerican Opinion. Both men may have entered the controversies out
of a sense of duty rather than choice. Despite those similarities, the Court
considered the police commissioner to be a public official and Gertz to be
a private individual.
When women are plaintiffs in defamation actions, this public/
private distinction becomes even more problematic'. Courts frequently
find that women are public figures when they bring defamation actions
even though women have frequently not injected themselves voluntarily
into the controversy and do not have the resources to rebut effectively the
sex-based defamation. The sharp public/private distinction fails to
recognize that women remain powerless in the public sphere, even when
they are involved in a public controversy.
This article proposes that the courts analyze the parties' relative
powers rather than make a sharp and inaccurate public/private dis-
tinction. This focus on relative power is consistent with Warren and
Brandeis' concern about intrusions on less powerful groups, as well as
some group libel case law.
ll. Invasion of Privacy Actions For Pornographic Intrusions
The historical discussion of invasion of privacy action has shown
that a false public/private distinction, a false assumption that women
share men's power, the preservation of traditional values, and an
individual-based perspective pervade privacy doctrine. This section of
the article will illustrate how those factors render court responses to
women's invasions of privacy actions wholly inadequate. The first factor
will not be considered separately.
A. False Assumption That Women Share Men's Power
This erroneous assumption is part of two specific doctrines that
100. The falseness of that distinction, however, is quite different than Justice Brennan
claimed in Rosenbloom. See supra note 97. Brennan thought the public/ private distinction
was false because private individuals may have sufficient resources to rebut defamation,
and public individuals may not. He was not challenging the distinction itself; instead, he was
challenging its relationship to the concept of effective rebuttal.
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often emerge in women's invasion of privacy actions for porno-
graphic intrusions: (1) consent/waiver doctrine, and (2) public figure
doctrine.
1. Consent/Waiver Doctrine
The consent/waiver doctrine is a contractually-related theory that
often appears in invasion of privacy cases. Defendants in these cases often
argue that the women consented to the portrayals or waived their right to
object. Two assumptions underlie legal consideration of this issue:
(1) women have the power to choose freely not to be portrayed
pornographically, and (2) women's consent precludes injury. This
article will argue that so long as women only have injurious options from
which to choose, the fact of choice is irrelevarft to the injury. Women's lack
of choice is an aspect of their group-based powerlessness.
a. Existence of Choice
Joyce Martin, the "hat check girl," whose story is told at the
beginning of this article, argued that the defendants had the duty to obtain
her consent before using her photograph and the accompanying language
in its Knoxville News Sentinel'0 advertisement. She also alleged that the
community's assumption that she had consented to the portrayal "had
caused her great mental pain, humiliation and mortification and tended to
expose her to public ridicule and disgrace ... ." 12 The court denied
Martin's claim, finding that by consenting to have her picture taken for an
internal club bulletin, she had implicitly consented to have the picture
and accompanying text shown to the public at large. 03
Similarly, Mary Jane Russell argued that the defendants should
have obtained her consent before using her retouched photograph to
advertise Springs bedsheets. She alleged she was harmed by the
101. Martin %. Senators, Inc., 220 Tenn. 465, 418 S.W.2d 660 (1967).
102. Id. at 469, 418 S.W.2d at 662.
103. Since it is clear from the declaration the photographs were taken with
plaintiffs consent for publication in a bulletin published by the Senators
Club to be distributed to its members, and since it appears from the face of
the declaration that this is a public club in the sense that membership therein
is open to all who will pay the small amount charged for annual membership,
and there is no suggestion the bulletin was exclusively for the eyes of the
members, we think the subsequent use by the Senators Club of one of these
photographs in an advertisement which depicted plaintiff as a hat check girl,
implicitly referring to her as such in the statement, "Let us check your hat,"
was not an actionable invasion of plaintiff's privacy. Her prior consent for
her photographs to be circulated freely among that segment of the public
comprising the membership of the Senators Club, and implicitly to be shown
by them to anyone else interested, was a waiver of her right of privacy with
respect to these photographs.
Id. at 472, 418 S.W.2d at 664.
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community's assumption that she had consented to her portrayal. 04 Her
complaint stated:
[Russell's] high professional standing and concomitant earning
power have been achieved by meticulous adherence to the highest
standards of professional . . . conduct and good taste for herself
and for her clients. The plaintiffs professional services and
photographs have never been available for purposes of advertising
or trade to anyone who resorts to bad taste, immodesty, double
entendre or similar techniques in his appeals for public attention.
The use of a photograph of the plaintiff by an advertiser known to be
an adherent of such techniques connotes that the plaintiff had
consented to such use. Such consent, if given by the plaintiff, would
ruin her professional standing and earning power and cause her to
be shunned by family and friends and in the community in which
she lives and works.'
Because Russell had signed a standard "model release" waiving the right
to inspect or approve the completed portraits,'0 6 the court found that the
defendants had not breached the contract. Nevertheless, the court found
Russell had stated a limited cause of action for a statutory invasion of
privacy because the picture was altered. '7 That cause of action, however,
would not exist when the defendant changed the purpose or extent of the
picture's use.' 8 Thus, Joyce Martin, who was harmed by an unintended,
although unaltered use of her photograph, would be excluded from the
theory adopted by the Russell court.
In Ann-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc.,'0 9 the court also
presumed consent.
104. Russell v. Marboro Books, 18 Misc.2d 166, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1959).
105. Id. at 169-70. 183 N.Y.S.2d at 15-16.
106. The model release stated:
The undersigned hereby irrevocably consents to the unrestricted use by
Richard Avedon, advertisers, customers. successors and assigns, of my
name, portrait or picture, for advertising purposes or purposes of trade and I
waiv-e the right to inspect or approve such completed portraits, pictures. or
advertising matter used in connection herewith.
Id. at 173. 183 N.Y.S.2d at 18-19.
107. According to the court, "it does not follow that the consent signed by the plaintiff
goes beyond its wording so as to exculpate, asa matter of law, the dissemination of all type of
altered pictures or of libelous material." Id. at 182, 183 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
108. According to the court:
If. for instance. Springs had used the original picture for its advertising of
bedsheets, without the attendant objectionable writing or references, the fact
that the purpose of the advertisement was not to interest readers in books
uould not negate the effect of the release.
Id. at 182. 183 N.Y.S.2d at 27.
109. Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F.Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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The plaintiff in the instant action chose to appear partially nude
during one scene in a major motion picture which she knew was to be
widely distributed. Upon release, that film, which was highly
successful, was seen by millions of persons. It has been held that
where an individual consents to be viewed in a certain manner
during the course of a public performance, such as in a movie, it
cannot then be argued that a subsequent faithful reproduction (no
allegation has been made that the picture has been altered) of that
appearance constitutes an invasion of privacy."
Unlike Russell, Ann-Margret had no statutory invasion of privacy claim
because her picture was not altered. Evidence that her "decision to
disrobe was an 'artistic' one, made in light of the script necessities" and
that she carefully limited the portrayal itself, was of no avail in arguing
that her consent did not include the magazine's unauthorized use of the
photograph.'
In all three cases, the courts resolved the consent issue against the
plaintiffs by assuming they were free, equal, powerful actors in the public
sphere. The courts did not consider the powerless, feminized occupations
these three women held. The Martin court found that the plaintiff hat
checker had "implicitly" consented to her portrayal, including its
widespread dissemination, by allowing the defendant to take her
picture." ' The Russel! c- rt assumed that the plaintiff model consented
to the unaltered use of her picture by another advertiser because she
supposedly could have easily negotiated a contract that would have made
each portrayal subject to her approval.I" Similarly, the Ann-Margret
court assumed that by consenting to appear partially nude in one movie
scene, the plaintiff actress consented to the magazine's publication of her
partially nude photograph. The courts assumed the plaintiffs had a real
choice-they could have refused to have their sexuality exploited. This
illustrates women's public powerlessness and male eagerness to deny
such inequality. As long as the courts found consent, no invasion of
privacy action could exist.
110. Id. at 405 (footnote and citations omitted).
111. Id. at403 n.2.
112. See supra note 103.
113.Those "who wish to do business in accordance with the trade usage must
[merely] expressly incorporate this desire into their contracts" (70 Harv. L
Rev. 553, 555, commenting upon Avedon v. Exstein, 141 F.Supp. 278,
which suit also arose out of the transaction involved in the instant action).
Those who desire to do so may, and if they take care can, execute or accept
effective releases consenting to use only by the immediate prospective
client.
Russell, 18 Misc. at 178, 183 N.Y.S. 2d at 24. This article challenges the assumption that it
is a"mere" or simple matter for a woman within the pornography industry to get her desires
expressed in the contract.
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The plaintiffs, however, had no real choice. As women, their work
was feminized. An implicit part of their work was to be objects for men's
sexual pleasures. They consented only in the sense that they chose
occupations within the narrow range available to women. Russell, for
example, knew she had contracted as a professional model. The contract
implied that her sexuality could be used to promote her employer's
business. She consented to the implied provision only in the sense that
she accepted the conditions of employment that employers typically
require of women, particularly women in sex-segregated jobs. Even
Russell's high community and professional stature could not give her the
economic and political leverage to negotiate different terms. Similarly,
Ann-Margret could not avoid appearing partially nude in the film, despite
her professional standing.
The inevitable and unauthorized nature of the sexualization of
women's work occurs in all contexts of women's sexual oppression.' 4
The sexualization of the labor market makes women victims of sexual
objectification as part of their work.
The feminization of whole sectors of the labor force is well
documented. Not recognized is that this gender-definition includes
sexualization of the women worker as part of the job. Until it is
changed, this makes sexual harassment systematically inevitable
for the masses of women who must take the only jobs society opens
to them." 5
This sexualization means that when women enter any job, and parti-
cularly a traditionally female job, men will sexualize their work.
Similarly, when women are photographed- whether as a hat checker,
high class model, or actress-they are photographed as sexual objects.
114. C. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women 18 (1979). See also
Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil RightsAct of
1964, 12 U. Mich. J.L Ref. 397 (1979); Committee on Pay Equity, Manual on Pay Equity:
Raising Wages for Women's Work (1980). It was not until 1973 that sex-segregated
advertisements were held to be illegal. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
The Supreme Court has begun to recognize some of the wage disparities that can
accompany segregated work and has permitted a limited remedy in the case of intentional
discrimination (although, of course, it has never connected the problem to sexual
objectification). County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981). See also
International Union of Electrical Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094
(3rd Cir. 1980) (permitting comparable worth claim).
115. C. MacKinnon, supra note 114, at 18. For an example of how pornography and
sexual harassment can interact on the job, see Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Emp. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1627 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (plaintiff police officer videotaped while strip
searching female prisoner videotape shown repeatedly to harass her, plaintiff continually
teased about photographs of nude women that her co-workers looked at while on the
job).
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Women's powerlessness to prevent sexualization of their work
illustrates women's particular susceptibility to abuse by the media and
need for legal protection."' It also demonstrates that women are
involuntary participants in their public portrayals and lack the resources
to rebut the images presented."'
b. Irrelevance of Consent
The focus on consent in these privacy cases presumes that women
who do consent are not injured. Because all women's work is sexualized,
however, all women's choices result in injury. The fact that women must
accept injury to survive should not preclude women from objecting to
their injury. By focusing on consent, courts preclude women-regardless
of what choices they make--from objecting to the norms of sexuality that
are a part of invasions of privacy.
Women who work within the pornography industry have described
their daily injury, despite their compensation and supposed consent.
Let us go back to those who let themselves be photographed. Yes, I
am one of them. I believed that I was so liberated that nothing could
touch me. Nobody could exploit me. Why did I do it? I had to get a lot
of money fast and that was the easiest way. It paid well. But how I felt
doing it was something else! I felt it as a violence against my body to
be exhibited like a piece of meat, and a violence against all women.
All women suffered because I supported the pornography in-
dustry.
The many women I talked to during my three months as a
pornography model often hated themselves. But it was very often of
bitter necessity that they did it. They had to. Their husbands drank,
or they were single mothers. Others felt they had to compete by
wearing smarter clothes. For some it was just to be the one time,
because they wanted to buy this or that. But for me it was many
times. For me too it was almost impossible to get out again. The
money is good and for many women it is easy to get into drinking
during the photography session.
I learned quickly to hate my body and myself for supporting
capitalists and their easy money, and for supporting this society's
decay. And I learned too that it is men who have the upper hand in
this situation. "a
116. Compare this observation with Warren and Brandeis' concern about the possibility
of media abuse. See supra text accompanying note 42.
117. Compare this observation with the GertziNew York Times doctrine's concern
about voluntariness. See supra text accompanying notes 82.110. Women, on average, have
less than 60% of the earning power of men. See generally supra note 114.
118. TestimonyAgainst Pornography: /itnessfrom Denmark, in Take Back the Night,
supra note 26, at 84-85.
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Linda Lovelace provides a specific example of injury, despite
apparent consent Chuck Traynor introduced Lovelace to the world of
pornography. Through hypnotism, beatings, and threats, Traynor forced
Lovelace to "consent" to model for underground pornography, engage in
prostitution and star in the movie "Deep Throat." Lovelace describes the
world in which Traynor kept her.
. .. Chuck didn't let me out of his sight. Instead of asking me to
do things, he told me. And as if to back up his words, he was always
playing with his guns. . . . Every day, while he played with his
guns, we went through the same sequence. He would tell me he was
going to resume his prostitution business and I was going to be his
new madam. I would tell him no. He would hit me. Before too long, I
learned to keep my opinions to myself, I didn't change them but I no
longer bothered expressing them."'
Lovelace's silence became consent She consented to survive. Each act of
survival, however, caused Lovelace injury.
Every new degradation made me weaker and more docile. Now I felt
totally defeated. There were no greater humiliations left for me. The
memory of that day and that dog [from an underground film in
which Lovelace had sex with a dog] does not fade the way other
memories do. The overwhelming sadness that I felt on that day is
with me at this moment, stronger than ever.'
Lovelace's injury continues to this day, in part, because of the
notoriety she received from her portrayal in the movie "Deep Throat"
"[T] he world won't let Linda Lovelace rest in peace. Today I still can't go
to a supermarket or a bus station or a high school basketball game without
the risk-the whispers, the pointed fingers, the stampedes." 121 Lovelace,
however, cannot bring a lawsuit to remedy her continuing injury, in part,
because of her supposed consent. 2
Cabaniss v. Hipsley also illustrates the problem of focusing on
consent.'23 Hipsley, an exotic dancer, had appeared at two Atlanta night
spots, the Club Peachtree and the Gypsy Room. Her advertising picture
depicted her "as a luscious lithesome, bosomy brunette clad only in two
tantalizing tassels and a scanty G-string."'' 24 Although she had never
119. L Lovelace, supra note 15, at 28-29.
120. Id. at 113.
121. Id. at 1.
122. Although Lovelace has sought legal assistance to recover damages and obtain
injunctive relief from the showing of "Deep Throat," she has brought no legal action. Her
lawyers have concluded that she probably has no cognizable legal claim, for a multitude of
reasons. The group privacy theory, however, that this article develops, could aid Lovelace.
In fact, helping women like Lovelace is one of the major purposes of this article.
123. Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496 (1966).
124. Id. at 369, 151 S.E.2d at 499.
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appeared at the Atlanta Playboy Club, the Club used her picture in its
advertisement. It billed her as"Dawn Darling- Provocative and Exciting
Exotic Dancer" with the underlying caption, "She's terrific."' 23 Hipsley
brought an action for invasion of privacy. Although the court allowed her
appropriation claim, 12 6 it denied recovery under any other right to
privacy action, finding that the defendant had not portrayed Hipsley in a
context materially different from the one in which she frequently
portrayed herself.'2 She was an exotic dancer and had been so portrayed
by the defendant. ' 2 The court perceived no difference between Hipsley
choosing to portray herself as an exotic dancer for her own profit and the
Playboy Club's decision to portray her as an exotic dancer for its
profit. 129
The underlying assumption in Hipsley that the plaintiff could not
be injured because she commonly portrayed herself in a similar role 3 '
was even more explicit inAnn-Margret v. High Society Magazine, Inc.,
the case involving the woman who was pictured partially nude in
"Magic." One reason the court denied Ann-Margret recovery was that
such injury happens all the time. The defendant magazine specialized in
printing photographs of well-known women "caught in the most revealing
situations and positions that the defendants are able to obtain."''
According to the court, the magazine had similarly portrayed Brigitte
Bardot, Greta Garbo, and Caroline Kennedy. 2 Because films like
"Magic" and magazines such as Playboy frequently use such photo-
graphs for commercial purposes, the court could not conceive of the
possibility that substantial injury could accompany such a portrayal. The
125. Id.
126. Id. at 379, 151 S.E.2d at 504-05.
127. Id. at 380, 151 S.E.2d at 505.
128. Id. at 376-77, 151 S.E.2d at 503.
The only falsity or fiction revealed by this evidence is that plaintiff was
falsely pictured as appearing at the Atlanta Playboy Club under the stage
name of "Dawn Darling." This evidence does not authorize a verdict for
general damages for injury to plaintiffs reputation or to her sensibilities.
There is no evidence to indicate that the stage name "Dawn Darling" is in a
category materially different from that which would include the stage names
"Melanie Lark" and "Charming Charmaine De Aire," which plaintiff used,
nor is there evidence to indicate that the Atlanta Playboy Club was in any
material respect different from the types of clubs plaintiff customarily
played, such as Club Peachtree or the Gypsy Room. She was not presented in
a false light she was revealed as an exotic strip-tease, which she was.
129. See supra note 128.
130. "Plaintiff was what is commonly referred to as a strip-tease, and, by the very nature
of her occupation, the facts disclosed were neither private nor embarassing to her."
Cabaniss, 114 Ga. App. at 374, 151 S.E.2d at 502.
131. Ann-Margret, 498 F. Supp. at 403.
132. Id. at 404 n.6. Brigitte Bardot was apparently photographed surreptitiously by
telephoto lens; Caroline Kennedy's photograph was apparently altered. Id.
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court characterized the press as, "at times, . . . trivial, and even
obnoxious" but protected the magazine "because of the important part it
[the press] plays in protecting our liberty."' 33 The underlying assump-
tion was not so much that Ann-Margret consented but that all of society
consented on her behalf in order to protect its liberty.
Similarly, in Vitale, the court presumed that plaintiff was not
injured by the National Lampoon parody because she consented to the
Playboy centerfold. 3 4 It did not consider the possibility that Playboy's
portrayal may also have injured Vitale. Playboy Magazine, the Club
Peachtree, and the film "Magic" at least paid Vitale, Hipsley and Ann-
Margret for their injuries. National Lampoon, the Playboy Club, and
High Society Magazine did not.
The concept of consent presumes that by agreeing to a portrayal, a
woman avoids all injury. The appropriate question in Hipsley, Vitale,
and Ann-Margret should have been whether the Playboy Club's,
National Lampoon's, and High Society Magazine's portrayals caused
injury, not whether the plaintiffs normally consented to injury to
survive.
A false presumption of political power also underlies the emphasis
that courts place on the consent issue. Political power is an aspect of
privilege. The focus on consent emphasizes the degree to which women
may be privileged to avoid having only injurious options. More privileged
women (for example, women who can afford to be unemployed) can
choose to avoid sexual abuse through pornographic portrayals; however,
they will still be subject to sexual abuse in other aspects of their lives, e.g.,
wife battery, rape, incest, the myth of the vaginal orgasm, the denial of
lesbian existence, and social and legal rules about women's clothing. 35
A woman's consent does not lessen her injury. In fact, evidence of
consent is evidence of women's oppression as women-the injurious
options to which women are limited. Control over women's sexuality
133. Id. at 406 n.12.
134. Vitale, 449 F. Supp. at 445.
135. See generally MacKinnon, supra note 28, at 532 (exploring women's sexual
oppression through sexual harassment, rape, incest, pornography and prostitution); K.
Barry, supra note 50 (prostitution, marriage, and pornography); S. Brownmiller, Against
Our Will (1975) (rape); A. Davis, supra note 19 (slavery, sterilization, and housework); A.
Dworkin, Woman Hating (1974) (pornography, gynocide, and fairy tales); Koedt, The
Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm, in Voices From Women's Liberation (L Tanner ed. 1970);
Schulman, Sex and Power: Sexual Bases of Radical Feminism, in Women-Sex and
Sexuality, supra note 52, at 21-35; A. Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality & Lesbian
Existence, in Women-Sex, and Sexuality, supra note 52, at 62 (denial of lesbian
existence); A. Rich, supra, note 53 (birthing and child-rearing); Whisner, Gender Specific
Clothing Regulation:A Study in Patriarchy, 5 Harv. Women's LJ. 75 (1981) (rules about
clothing); Note, Domestic Violence: Legislative and Judicial Remedies, 2 Harv. Women's
L. 167 (1979) (domestic violence).
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exists regardless of whether women actually "consent" to it. Women's
political powerlessness reflects their lack of control over their sex-
uality.
The courts, when focusing on consent, presume that consent is an
all or nothing concept. That false presumption contributes to the
problems caused by the traditional formulation of consent. Courts fail to
see that women may consent to sell some but not all of their sexuality. As a
hat checker, model, actress, or dancer, a woman may make the choice to
sell some of her sexuality. She has probably rationalized that she could
sell some of her sexuality without entirely losing her sexual integrity.
Hence, she may distinguish between the Gypsy Room and the Playboy
Club, although an outside observer may perceive no difference. Similar-
ly, she may distinguish between an internal club bulletin and the
Knoxville Sentinel. Nevertheless, in each case, men failed to respect that
choice and male jurisprudence upheld their right to do so. Men robbed
these women of their last vestiges of control over their sexuality.
2. Public Figure Doctrine
Courts' analyses of public figure doctrine in defamation law in some
of these cases further illustrates the courts' false assumption of women's
power.
Carol Vitale, the object of the National Lampoon parody, alleged
that the "use of her photograph, together with the accompanying
comment, was defamatory and libelous in that it depicted her as a tramp
and a lady of perverted morals."' 16 The court granted National Lam-
poon's motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiff was a public
figure. (She had not asserted proof of actual malice).
Plaintiff voluntarily posed for the nude and semi-nude photographs
published by Playboy magazine on this and other occasions, and
both consented to and received payment for their publication. She
obviously sought international circulation of her photographs and
her expectations were fulfilled. 3 '
The court, however, found that Vitale was a public figure only with
respect to her role in Playboy magazine. Plaintiff would not be a public
figure, and would not have to prove actual malice, under other factual
configurations.
If, for example, defendant had stated that plaintiff was a Com-
munist, the normal standards for recovery would apply, since
plaintiff is not a public figure for purposes of her political
affiliations. '
136. Vitale, 449 F. Supp. at 445.
137. Id. at 445.
138. Id. at 445 n.8.
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The premise underlying this distinction was that Vitale had voluntarily
placed herself in the public domain in the role of a Playboy model,
inviting attention and comment, but had not done so for other roles. The
premise assumes generally that sexuality can be separated from a
woman's essence in some roles and specifically that sexuality can never
be political.
Victoria Price Street brought both libel and invasion of privacy
actions against NBC for its broadcast of a historical drama based on the
Scottsboro rape trials. Street alleged the drama portrayed her in a
derogatory light. She was described as a "bum," "hustle," and
"whore."' 3 9
The court found that the common law privilege of fair and accurate
reporting of judicial proceedings did not apply because the historical
drama did not present a balanced or neutral view.'40 The drama
emphasized the portions of the original trial that showed Street as a
perjurer and promiscuous woman. Nevertheless the court found that the
plaintiff was a public figure and denied recovery.
In reaching that conclusion, the court extensively analyzed the
specific factors articulated in Gertz and its progeny for defining public
figures. One factor was whether plaintiff had "access to the channels of
effective communication and hence . . . a . . . realistic opportunity
to counteract false statements."' 4 ' The court resolved that factor against
plaintiff, finding she "had access to the media and was able to broadcast
her view of the events." '14
2
The Street court also recognized that Gertz required a finding that
the plaintiff had voluntarily thrust herself to the forefront of a public
controversy. The resolution of that issue, according to the court,
depended on whether Street had falsely accused the defendants of rape.
Nevertheless, instead of resolving the voluntariness issue, the court
eliminated it from the Gertz test.
When the issue of truth and the issue of voluntariness are the same, it
is necessary to determine the public figure status of the individual
without regard to whether she "voluntarily" thrust herself in the
139. Street, 645 F. 2d at 1231-32, cert. granted, 454 U.S. 815, cert. dismissed, 454
U.S. 1095 (1981). 1 find Street to be the most troublingof all the cases in this article because
it presents a tension between racial and sexual oppression. It is all too easy to downplay
either the racial or sexual aspects of the case in analyzing and describing it. I have tried to
look at both aspects equally but recognize that the context of this article, sexual oppression,
may have overemphasized the sexual aspects of the case. For an excellent discussion of the
racial and sexual tensions in rape cases, see Note, Rape, Racism and the Law, 6 Harv.
Women's LJ. 103 (1983). See also supra notes 18-22.
140. Street, 645 F.2d at 1233.
141. Id. at 1234 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 [1974]).
142. Id.
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forefront of the public controversy. . . . In such a case, the other
factors, - prominence and access to media-alone would determine
public figure status."'
Although the court claimed to eliminate one aspect of the public figure
test, it really created an irrebuttable presumption of voluntariness. The
court's reformulation precluded Street from showing that she was an
involuntary participant, not a public figure.
The resolution of the public figure issue in Street presents the same
problem the consent issue raised in Martin, Russell, and Ann-Margret.
The Street court assumed plaintiff had the power to both rebut the sexual
message and not participate in the public controversy. The false
presumption of effective rebuttal is especially apparent in Street's case.
At the time of NBC's broadcast, Street was living in obscure poverty.'44
Even at the time of the original trial, she was a victim of both class-based
and sex-based oppression. As a poor woman who accused men of rape,
she, like most women, was characterized as a whore by the defense. When
NBC portrayed the trial it emphasized that aspect of the case.
Street also demonstrates how women and people of color can be
pawns for the news media. 4 5 At the time of the original rape trial, the
media interviewed Street extensively. Presumably, it preferred to portray
the Black youths as rapists rather than report the racism of a judicial
system that failed to give them a fair trial. Forty years later, it may have
become more fashionable or profitable for the media to comment on the
racism of the Scottsboro trials. Nevertheless, it could not depict those
trials without exaggerating the issue of whether Street was a whore, an
issue irrelevant to whether the American judicial system is racist. '" The
purpose of the invasion of privacy action, as articulated by Warren and
Brandeis, was to hold the media accountable for such false charac-
terizations of powerless people. The courts' erroneous assumption that
female plaintiffs have the power to rebut their false portrayals under-
mines the effectiveness of both defamation and invasion of privacy
actions.' 4'
The falseness of the courts' assumption that female plaintiffs have
the power to rebut their portrayals is particularly evident in Linda
143. Id. at 1234-35.
144. See supra note 22.
145. Cf. A. Rich, supra note 28, at 224 (exploring how women are often the scapegoats
for societal abuses).
146. Consider also the unfairness of the portrayal in terms of the lapse of time. No one
claims Street is a whore today, yet the racism of the judicial system unfortunately remains an
all too timely issue.
147. See also Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, 498 F.Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(considering plaintiff to be a public figure despite her acknowledged attempts to limit her
public portrayal).
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Lovelace's case. Lovelace's image has been projected upon the movie
screen throughout the United States yet she has never had the power to tell
her story-the story of a woman imprisoned and forced to become a
prostitute and a pornographic movie star.
Lovelace tried to tell reporters the truth of her enslavement when
her husband and manager, Chuck Traynor, allowed her to be inter-
viewed. But they didn't want to hear it. The tape recorders and cameras
were shut off when she tried to tell the truth. 4" After escaping from
Traynor, Lovelace wrote a book, Ordeal, that described her captivity. Its
publication has made Lovelace the defendant in a lawsuit for defamation
brought by Traynor's lawyer. (Lovelace accuses the lawyer of creating
contracts of adhesion in the book.) Lovelace did not have the power to
state her case publicly in a lawsuit; however, Traynor and his lawyer
do.
B. Preservation of Traditional Values
Privacy doctrine helps preserve traditional values through the
doctrine of offensiveness or reasonability that often emerges in women's
invasion of privacy actions. Rejecting Warren and Brandeis' assumption
that technological intrusions into a woman's sexuality are necessarily
unreasonable, many courts try to determine whether the plaintiff
responded to the alleged invasion of privacy in a reasonable or super-
sensitive manner. This investigation preserves traditional values and
precludes the traditional (i.e., sensitive) woman from obtaining relief.
The Martin court, for instance, resolved the supersensitivity issue
against the plaintiff. It found the defendant's conduct not to be "such that
a defendant should have realized it would be offensive to persons of
ordinary sensibilities . . . . "1'49 The court felt Martin was supersen-
sitive in complaining about the advertisement because her "photo-
graphs . . . [were] not exhibited . . . to humiliate or embarrass
her." 50
In Pring v. Penthouse International Ltd., the case involving Miss
Wyoming's portrayal by Penthouse Magazine, the court applied a
reasonability standard. The court asked "whether the charged portions in
context could be reasonably understood as describing actual facts about
the plaintiff or actual events in which she participated."" '' The court
presumed liability could not ensue if the article would be considered
fictional. It rejected the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness "that some
individuals might attach a broader subliminal meaning of sexual
148. L Lovelace, supra note 15, at 247.
149. Martin, 220 Tenn. at 473, 418 S.W. 2d at 664.
150. Id. at 468, 418 S.W.2d at 662.
151. Pring, 695 F. 2d at 442.
1983]
Law and Inequality
permissiveness""' 2 to the article, because all the lay witnesses testified
that the article was not about the plaintiff. The court characterized the
story as"a gross, unpleasant, crude, distorted attempt to ridicule the Miss
America contest and contestants," with "no redeeming features what-
ever."'3 3 Nevertheless, the court rejected plaintiff's claims for defama-
tion, presentation in a false light, and outrageous conduct, because it
found the article to be "obviously a complete fantasy."
1
1
4
The dissent criticized the court's application of the "reasonably
understood" test. It found that "[t]he descriptions of the conduct of
Miss Wyoming would make even the most careless reader aware of sexual
deviation and perversion.""'
The Pring court's application of the "reasonably understood" test
illustrates the extreme positions courts have taken to avoid recognizing
the harm of pornography to the woman portrayed and all of society. The
court assumed that a fictional account of an identifiable person could
cause no harm, even though an expert had contradicted that assumption
and the jury had drawn the opposite conclusion. It implicitly rejected the
observation made by many critics of pornography that fantasy and reality
are inextricably connected.' On the one hand, the reader may "know"
that the story is about a fictional character, on the other hand, the story
152. Id. at 443.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra text accompanying note 151. The Pring majority derived the "reason-
ably understood" test from two Supreme Court decisions, Greenbelt Coop. Publishing
Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970), and Old Dominion Branch No. 496 Ass'n v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264 (1974). Both cases involved plaintiffs found to be public figures. In both cases the
Court applied the "reasonably understood" test and found the alleged defamatory articles
essentially accurate and truthful reports of a public event. In Greenbelt, a newspaper report
accurately stated that the plaintiffs were described at a city council meeting as having
engaged in blackmail. In Old Dominion, a union newsletter which described the plaintiffs as
"scabs" was found to be literally and factually accurate. Although the Court in Greenbelt
admitted that the label of " blackmail" might connote the commission of a criminal offense, it
found that "even the most careless reader must have perceived that the word was no more
than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler's
negotiating position extremely unreasonable." 398 U.S. at 14. Similarly, in Old Dominion,
the Court found that the use of the word, "scab," although it has negative connotations was
.. merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by
union members towards those who refuse to join." 418 U.S. at 286.
156. Pring, 695 F.2d at444 (Breitenstien, J., dissenting). The Pring dissent objected to
the use of the "reasonably understood" test, because Penthouse did not claim that the act of
fellatio by Miss Wyoming was true. The word "fellatio," according to the dissent, "was not
used as an hyperbole or epithet. It was used to describe a physical act." Id. Another problem
with the use of the test, which the dissent did not mention, was the assumption that the
plaintiff was a public figure even though she did not have the power to avoid being portrayed
by Penthouse nor did she profit by the depiction. Greenbelt and Old Dominion justified
their analysis with the public figure doctrine for newsreporting.
157. See, e.g., K. Barry, supra note 50, at 205-19.
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reinforces and shapes the reader's views of what women are, and what
women are for.
There is usually no reality check available or desired in the
pornographic experience. Fantasy and reality are blurred and
experienced with sexual stimulation in isolation. Distortions pre-
sented in pornography stimulate a sexual response which in turn
reinforces the enjoyment of distortions. When it is over, the
consumer may then choose what to believe and interpret as reality,
what to attribute to fantasy, and what to act out.1""
Baton twirling can become subliminally synonymous with the act of
fellatio, as described in the Penthouse Miss Wyoming story, despite the
seeming unrelatedness of those activities. The Pring court chose to deny
the existence of that connection.
One way the reasonableness standard harms women is by defining
sensitivity from a male point of view. The Martin court, for instance, only
explored whether the male defendant should have realized that the
Knoxville News Sentinel advertisement would be offensive. '5 9 The court
found Martin's employer not liable for invasion of privacy because he
only intended to profit commercially, rather than offend Martin. The
defendant's financially exploitative purpose, however, does not neces-
sarily lessen the offense to Martin. If degrading women sells, advertising
can degrade women without the advertiser intending to do so. He need
only intend to make money. The extent of the injury only becomes evident
when viewed from a female perspective. The courts refuse to look at the
injurious conduct from that perspective.
Insisting on exploring the supersensitivity issue from the male
defendant's point of view precludes privacy claimants from challenging
the male norms of society. 60 Supersensitivity may be necessary to
liberate women from male sexuality, because what is supersensitive from
a male point of view is simply injury from a feminist perspective. Insisting
that female plaintiffs restrict themselves to male standards of sensitivity
makes challenging male norms of sensitivity impossible.
Viewing sensitivity from a male point of view also precludes
recovery for the most vulnerable and most commonly abused women-
those who have a traditionally feminine, naive, or virgin image. Russell,
158. Id. at 178-79.
159. Martin, 220 Tenn. at 473, 418 S.W.2d at 664.
160. Criticizing pornography requires confronting morality and the norms of sexuality,
because pornography depicts these norms. Exposing the sexually objectifying message of
pornography, "that women are natural sexual prey to men and love it," Rich, Compulsory
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in Women-Sex and Sexuality, supra note 52, at
72, exposes the male control over sexuality within heterosexuality. It exposes the
congruence between sexuality, power, and violence.
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the professional model, exemplifies this problem. Springs, the bedsheet
advertiser, retouched her photograph because he had "been unable to
obtain for [his] bedsheet advertising photographic illustrations created
and participated in by persons of the professional stature and talents of
the plaintiff and of Avedon [the photographer]." '6 Similarly, Martin's
innocent or "virgin" image was part of the appeal of her photograph as a
"hat check girl." Thus although men take special pleasure in objectifying
and abusing apparently sexually inexperienced women and girls,
162
courts consider women who typify femininity supersensitive.
Lovelace also was subjected to abuse because of her naivete.
Explaining her first beating and rape at the hands of Traynor, she
stated:
Why me? Why would he come down so hard on me? Why didn't he
just use one of his hookers? Now I can guess at the answer it's
because an experienced hooker would have been too smart for him.
It's because a streetwalker would not have been stupid and naive
and gullible and scared." 3
Lovelace's stupidity, naivity, and gullibility made her both attractive to
Traynor as well as an easy victim. Those traits made her stereotypically
feminine. Those same traits, however, viewed from a male perspective,
make her unreasonable and supersensitive. A male perspective penalizes
Lovelace for not having the personal or political resources to escape from
subjugation.
161. Russell, 18 Misc. at 171,183 N.Y.S. 2d at 16 & 17. The plaintiff elaborated on her
excellent reputation.
The plaintiff (a college graduate, the wife of the co-plaintiff and the mother of
their young sons) is a well-known professional high-fashion photographic
model, portraying before the cameras of the leading fashion photographers
the intelligent, refined, well-bred, pulchritudinous, ideal young wife and
young mother, in artistic settings and socially-approved situations. Her
earnings are among the highest in her vocation. Her high professional
standing and concomitant earning power have been achieved by meticulous
adherence to the highest standards of professional conduct and good taste for
herself and for her clients. The plaintiffs professional services and photo-
graphs have never been available for purposes of advertising or trade to
anyone who resorts to bad taste, immodesty, double entendre or similar
techniques in his appeals for public attention. The use of a photograph of the
plaintiff by an advertiser known to be an adherent of such techniques,
connotes that the plaintiff had consented to such use. Such consent, if given
by the plaintiff, would ruin her professional standing and earning power and
cause her to be shunned by family and friends and in the community in
which she lives and works.
Id. at 15-16 (quoting from plaintiffs complaint).
162. A. Dworkin, supra note 26.
163. L. Lovelace, supra note 15. at 27.
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A Second Circuit opinion, Geisler v. Petrocelli,'64 recognized the
unfairness of creating a rule of law which precludes the most traditionally
virtuous women from recovering in an invasion of privacy action.
Plaintiff, Melanie Geisler, worked as a publicity assistant for a company
where the defendant, Petrocelli, had also been employed. After leaving
the company, Petrocelli wrote a "potboiler" describing the "odyssey of a
female transsexual athlete through the allegedly corrupt and corrupting
world of the women's professional tennis circuit." 161 Petrocelli named his
central character "Melanie Geisler" and gave her the plaintiffs physical
characteristics. Geisler sued.
Petrocelli moved for dismissal, alleging the pleaded facts "were
insufficient to establish that the behavior of a character in a self-
proclaimed fictional book was 'of and concerning' appellant.""'6 The
court rejected defendant's argument, finding the law required only
that plaintiff must demonstrate that third parties apprehend the
similarity between the real person and her literary cognate as
something more than amusing coincidence or even conscious
parallelism on a superficial plane. Rather, it is required that the
reasonable reader must rationally suspect that the protagonist is in
fact the plaintiff, notwithstanding the author's and publisher's
assurances that the work is fictional. b7
According to the court, plaintiff was "noticeably unconventional in
neither conduct nor appearance.""," Defendant argued that it was
inconceivable that people could mistake the plaintiff for the character in
the story. Under that rule, a man could easily defame a conventional
woman without fear of reprisal. 69
Ironically, the supersensitivity issue also exaggerates the injustice
of the consent/waiver issue. A woman who is not supersensitive, for
164. 616 F.2d 636 (2nd Cir. 1980).
165. Id. at 638.
166. Id. at 639
167. Id.
168. Id. at 638.
169. The court disapproved of such a result and refused to grant defendant's motion as a
matter of law. Nevertheless, it did submit the matter to the jury. Id at 639.
This reveals a disturbing irony inherent in the law: the more virtuous the victim of
the pornographic intrusion, the less likely it will be that she will be able to establish the
essential confusion in the mind of the third party. Thus, the more deserving the plaintiff of
recompense for the tarnishing of a spotless reputation, the less likely will be any actual
recovery. Id.
The Geisler court's understanding of the problem was quite probative. Such an
understanding could help the most "common" woman such as Joyce Martin, the"hatcheck
girl" who was abused because of her highly naive or traditional image. For further
discussion of the libel as fiction theory, see Wilson, The Law of Libel and the Art of Fiction,
44 Law & Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1981. at 27.
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example, a women like Vitale who explicitly works within the pornog-
raphy industry, will be considered to have consented to her portrayal.
Hence, a woman either consents or is supersensitive; there is rarely a
middle ground. She always loses-whether "virtuous" or not.
C. Individual-Based Perspective
This article has continually asserted that law precedes from an
individual-based rather than group-based perspective. In privacy doc-
trine this perspective has become quite explicit in the rejection of a group-
based cause of action. A few examples can reveal the existence and
significance of that failure. Part Three of this article will try to develop a
group based perspective in privacy actions.
In Neiman-Marcus v. Lait,1 0 Neiman-Marcus models and sales-
people sued the authors of a book entitled U.S.A. Confidential for libel.
The book described the models and saleswomen as prostitutes.
[SIome Neiman models are call girls-the top babes in the town.
The guy who escorts one feels in the same league with the playboys
who took out Ziegfield's glorified. Price, a hundred bucks a
night.
The salesgirls are good, too-pretty, and often much cheaper-
twenty bucks on the average. They're much fun, too, not as snooty as
the models. We got this confidential, from a Dallas wolf.
Neiman-Marcus also contributes to the improvement of the local
breed when it imports New York models to make a flash at style
shows. These girls are the cream of the crop. Old millionaires toss
around thousand-dollar bills for a chance to take them out."'
The individual-based perspective precluded the plaintiff saleswomen
from recovering damages. The allegedly libelous description had said
that Neiman salesgirls and "some" Neiman models were call girls. It also
described the salesmen as "fairies."" 2 At the time of the publication,
Neiman-Marcus employed nine female models (all of whom brought
suit), twenty-five salesmen (fifteen of whom brought suit), and 382
saleswomen (thirty of whom brought suit).
The defendant sought to dismiss the complaint as to the salesmen
and saleswomen, because no ascertainable person was identified by the
words complained of. The court applied the following two rules of law to
the situation, considering both rules to be widely accepted:
170. 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
171. Id. at 313.
172. Id.
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Where the group or class libelled is large, none can sue even though
the language used is inclusive. . . . Where the group or class
libelled is small, and each and every member of the group or class is
referred to, than any individual member can sue.'"I
Although the court found some disagreement among the circuits, it also
accepted the rule that suit is authorized "by each member of a small group
where the defamatory publication refers to but a portion of the
group.' 
7 4
Applying those three principles, the court dismissed the claim by
the individual saleswomen. Presumably, 382 saleswomen was too large a
group for defendant to libel whereas a group of twenty-five salesmen was
not. The court discounted the fact that the defendant had not limited its
statement to"some salesgirls.' 7 [The word, "some," had only qualified
the models.] The rules that the court applied precluded the possibility
that a statement could defame all the members of a large group. In
particular, that rule precludes the possibility of making the feminist
argument that pornography simultaneously degrades both the specific
women portrayed as well as all women, as it also contributes to the
maintenance of a pornographic culture which considers all women as sex
objects.
The individual-based perspective was also quite evident in Girl
Scouts of the United States of America v. Personality Posters Manu-
facturing Co., 76 a case involving the distribution of a poster of a smiling
girl dressed in the Girl Scout uniform, with her hands clasped above her
protruding, clearly pregnant abdomen. The caveat, "Be Prepared,"
appeared next to her hands. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, defamation:
It contends that defendant's poster is intended to impute unchastity
and moral turpitude to members of plaintiff, to hold plaintiff up to
ridicule and contempt, and to suggest that plaintiff's motto "BE
PREPARED" encourages the practice of contraception.'
The court denied plaintiff's allegations finding the record "bare of
any evidence that plaintiff's reputation has been or is likely to be affected
in any way by the wry, perhaps unmannerly, behavior of the defen-
dant." 178
The court's denial of plaintiffs allegation, however, did not even
properly restate the allegation. Plaintiff had alleged that its members,
173. Id. at 315.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 316.
176. 304 F.Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y 1969) (plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction
against publication and distribution of the poster).
177. Id. at 1234.
178. Id.
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rather than itself, a corporate entity, was injured by the portrayal. Instead
of considering the content of plaintiff's actual allegation of injury to the
group of Girl Scouts, the court transformed the allegation into an
individual-based allegation of injury to the Girl Scouts corporation.
Courts of nearly every jurisdiction fail to comprehend the existence
of group-based injury and the significance of their failure to comprehend
it.
111. Developing An Alternative Theory
Neither Warren and Brandeis' general concern for protecting
society from offensive intrusions, nor Gertz's recognition of the problem
of public powerlessness has been able to protect women from porno-
graphic exploitation. Three major reasons for that failure are the legal
disrepute of group-based theory, the lack of recognition that women are a
group lacking private and public power, and the preservation of
traditional sexual values.
Although Warren and Brandeis recognized the problem of group
powerlessness, they formulated their theory in terms of protecting the
integrity of the individual from the public eye. Similarly, the Gertz
doctrine sought to aid the lone individual, removed from the structure of
political or social power, who happened to come into the public eye.
Privacy doctrine's lack of a group-based component has made it a
poor tool for freeing women from oppression. For instance, the Roe
decision protected the individual within the privacy of the family; the
individual's sex or class was considered irrelevant. Poor women have
been unable to extend that decision to include a right to control their own
bodies by receiving state aid for abortions. Similarly, Black women have
not been able to use that decision to protect themselves from sterilization
abuse. As an individual-:based theory, privacy doctrine cannot help the
less privileged members of society, be they female, Black, or poor. At
most, it will preclude the state from intervening so that the traditional
family can control a woman's life. It then pretends that no oppression
exists within that traditional unit, because women are supposedly free
individuals within the family. Hence, the few times privacy doctrine has
recognized women's injury through pornography it has limited recovery
to the nonpersonal or nonsexual aspects of the injury. It has avoided
understanding the injury to women as women.
A group-based perspective would have revealed to Warren and
Brandeis that certain groups are more susceptible to the intrusions of
mass technology. It would have made the Gertz decision a treatise on the
history of political disenfranchisement in our country. The Roe decision
would have comprehended the physical enslavement that women are
forced to undergo in having no control over their bodies, in being forced to
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serve as incubators for nine months, and in having to be child raisers for
the child's ensuing lifetime. Rather than being heralded as a brillant
theory, Fuller's search for scientific neutrality or objectivity would have
been received as a deceptive rationalization for maintaining male bias in
law. A group-based perspective would bring the inevitable bias of any
decision to the forefront. Adopting a group-based perspective could
transform privacy doctrine into an effective remedy for pornographic
intrusions. That doctrine has some legal basis.
The Supreme Court in Beauharnais v. Illinois79 upheld the right
of the state to outlaw group libel. Beauharnais had published a leaflet
generally deprecating Blacks. The leaflet contained statements like the
following: "If persuasion and the need to prevent the white race from
becoming mongrelized by the negro [sic] will not unite us, the ag-
gression . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro
[sic], surely will.""' ° Beauharnais was convicted under an Illinois statute
which stated:
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manu-
facture, sell, or offer for sale, advertise or publish, present or exhibit
in any public place in this state any lithograph, moving picture,
play, drama or sketch, which publication or exhibition portrays
depravity. criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of
citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication
or exhibition exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion
to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of
the peace or riots . . . .
In Beauharnais, the Court explicitly recognized that individuals
may need group protection.
Such group-protection on behalf of the individual may, for all we
know, be a need not confined to the part that a trade union plays in
effectuating rights abstractly recognized as belonging to its mem-
bers. It is not within our competence to confirm or deny claims of
social scientists as to the dependence of the individual on the
position of his racial or religious group in the community. ...
[Tihe Illinois legislature may warrantly believe that a man's [sic]
job and his [sic] educational opportunities and the dignity accorded
him [sic] may depend as much on the reputation of the racial and
religious group to which he [sic] willy-nilly belongs, as on his [sic]
own merits. 2
179. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
180. Id. at 252.
181. Id. at 251.
182. Id. at 262-63.
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The Court justified the need for the Illinois statute by tracing the
state's history of racial tension. "I Although the Court was not convinced
that a group-based libel statute would necessarily eliminate such racial
tensions, it concluded that the legislature had the option of making that
policy choice. "'
TheBeauharnais decision, although it did not mention Warren and
Brandeis' work, paralleled their concern about the powerlessness of
certain groups against the power of the printed media. Beauharnais,
however, did not confine the problem to technological advances; it
realized that problems also grow out of other economic and social
conditions. It therefore introduced into group libel law a recognition of the
importance of understanding the social, political, and economic history
that may make group libel laws necessary. Such a recognition could aid
women injured by pornographic invasions of privacy.'
Before courts can use the group libel theory to redress women's
injuries, however, they must find that women as a group have faced a
history of oppression or servitude. 16 The only source of such a theory in
the Constitution is the thirteenth amendment. Courts have generally
denied women's attempts to apply the thirteenth amendment to claims of
discrimination because women supposedly have no history of ser-
vitude.18 Nevertheless, courts have sometimes recognized women's
183. Id. at 258-61.
184. Id. at 267.
185. Until recently, commentators considered Beauharnais to have limited prece-
dential value due to the Court's decisions in New York Times v. Sullivan and its progeny.
See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1204 (7th Cir. 1978) (finding three village
ordinances unconstitutional which were enacted to prohibit demonstrations by the Nazi
party); Sambo's Restaurant. Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1981)
(restaurant's right to use name "Sambo's Restaurant," protected by first amendment
despite its racial offensiveness); Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1094 (8th Cir.
1973) (vacating conviction for mailing obscene postcards); Anti-Defamation League of
B'Nai B'Rith Pacific Southwest Regional Office v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 174 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969) (upholding commission decision to grant license
renewal to station that had broadcast anti-Semitic programs). See also Garrison v.
Louisiana. 379 U.S. 64, 67-68 n.3 (1964) (narrowing Beauharnais decision).
The recent Supreme Court decision, New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct 3348 (1982),
however, has renewed the vitality of Beauharnais. In Ferber, the Court cited Beauharnais
with approval when public officials are not the target of a libelous publication. Id. at 3358.
Further, it extended group protection to children visually depicted performing sexual acts or
lewdly exhibiting their genitals. The Court labeled such depictions "child pornography."
186. Beauharnais had to conclude that blacks faced a history of racial tension before
developing a group-based theory for blacks. See supra note 179.
187. Cf. Great American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (male
plaintiff failing in attempt to use § 1985(3) in a sex discrimation suit). But see Weise v.
Syracuse Univ., 522 F.2d 397, 408-09 n.16 (2d Cir. 1975); Reichardt v. Payne, 396
F.Supp. 1010, 1018 (N.D. Calif. 1975); Pendrell v. Chaatam College, 386 F.Supp. 341,
347 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Stern v. Massachusetts Indem. & Life Insur. Co., 365 F.Supp. 433,
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group-based oppression. The Supreme Court in its plurality opinion in
Frontiero v. Richardson' stated:
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such
discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of "romantic pater-
nalism" which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but
in a cage . . . . As a result of notions such as these, our statute
books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions
between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century
the position of women in our society was, in many respects,
comparable to that of [B] lacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.
Neither slaves nor women could hold office, serve on juries, or bring
suit in their own names, and married women traditionally were
denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve as
legal guardians of their own children. . . . And although [B] lacks
were guaranteed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even
that right-which is itself "preservative of other basic civil and
political rights"-until adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment half
a century later.""
Additionally, some courts have acknowledged women's sex-based
oppression in the context of sexual harassment at the workplace. '90
The nineteenth amendment, which only in 1920 made women
voting citizens,' g' might also serve as source for that recognition. The
nineteenth amendment is particularly appropriate in light of the Gertz
decision's focus on effective free speech and the importance of a
representative democracy. So long as women systematically fail to get
elected to public office, a group-based Gertz doctrine could recognize
women's lack of effective free speech.
In order to succeed under a group libel theory, female plaintiffs
must also overcome the tendency of courts to uphold traditional values.
Recently in New York v. Ferber,"92 the Court extended group protection
442-43 (E.D. Pa. 1973); See generally Calhoun, The Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments: Constitutional Authority for Federal Legislation Against Private Sex
Discrimination, 61 Minn. L Rev. 313 (1977).
188. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
189. Id. at 684-85.
190. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Continental Can Co.,
Inc. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. 1980); Hayden v. Atlanta Newspapers, 534 F.Supp.
1166 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
191. U.S. Const. amend. XIX:
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legis-
lation.
192. New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982).
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to children depicted engaging in sexual activity or lewdly exhibiting their
genitals. The Court was willing to apply a group protection rationale to
children within the pornography industry because of society's tradi-
tional, special protection of children. It could reach that decision without
challenging the traditional notion of what is "obscene" or "morally
objectionable." In fact, it carefully limited its decision to child pornog-
raphy. 193
The radical feminist critique of pornography, however, does not
allow such an easy accommodation; radical feminists use pornography
and all examples of women's sexual abuse as an opportunity to critique
the norms of sexuality themselves. 19" Because the pervasive use of women
as sex objects is consistent with the norms of sexuality, courts refuse to
recognize women's abuse. Male jurisprudence defines the problem of
female sexual abuse narrowly and is indifferent to women's oppression.
Hence, it maintains the objectifying norms of sexuality.
Law is ill equipped to question traditional values. By definition, one
cannot look to past legal decisions or textual sources to question those
norms because the past embodies that tradition. Women, therefore, need
to assert the right to question traditional values, rather than pretend that
the source of a new value system can be found within tradition. That
hurdle may require legal changes to follow rather than lead a change in
norms, because it is practically impossible to get law to act outside of
established norms.
IV. Afterword
By focusing on how privacy doctrine could be transformed to aid
women in litigation, this article does not suggest that such efforts should
be the focus of the women's movement. Litigation, a coercive and
competitive tool, cannot replace more broad-based grassroots efforts to
change fundamentally the conditions which make pornography
possible.
This article explores privacy doctrine to show the pervasive ways
that male norms of sexuality enter and control women's lives. Feminists
may understand that the personal is political; law remains adverse to such
an understanding. In particular, feminists often unthinkingly value
privacy, not recognizing that the current legal conception of privacy helps
maintain women's oppression. This article challenges that unquestioned
assumption.
193. Id. at 3358.
194. See, e.g., A. Dworkin, supra note 26; Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and
Lesbian Existence, supra note 52; MacKinnon, supra note 28.
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